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-ABSTRACT-
This research is part of an overall effort to re-examine the
meaning of the housing process in economic and social development.
It looks at the locational relationship between certain manu-
facturing industries and their labor supply in order to under-
stand how the housing (urbanization process may affect the supply of
labor for economic activities outside housing construction.
It is as case study of the location of the plastic and shirt
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong in the early 50's and the late
60's. These industries represented the typical industrial op-
portunities available to entrepreneurs in Hong Kong,.Their pro-
duction processes and labor requirements were representative of
many industrial undertakings at significant stages of economic
and social development.
The logic of location is perceived as an optimization of
all the factors of production and market consideration. Each of
these location factors are analysised. Empirical evidence of the
patterns of factory location is used to verify the relative im-
protance of these factors.
Location of labor supply is found to be the most important
location consideration at the early stage of industrialization
when flexibility of production was the paramount concern and
labor mobility was severly limited. At a later stage stabali-
zed market demands, systemized and mechanized production, and
improved labor mobility made labor concentration a much less
important location consideration.
This research challenges the validity of conventional
theories of industrial firm location in a micro-urban develop-.
ing-economy':context. .It confirms the heterogenity
ii
of the location factors within a micro-urban setting and the
dynamics of these factors ina rapidly developing economy.
However the most revealing finding is that the location of
factories is but a physical manifestation of the underlying
dynamic urbanization-industrialization-social development inter-
relationship, that urbanization, industrialization and social
clevelopment can cause and reinforce one another. Depending on
the stage of development of each of these elements and the macro
socio-economic condition any of these can be critical to the
development of the others.
Their dynamic inter-relationship has significant policy
implications. Narrowly defined policy "concerns" (whether in
urbanization, industrialization and social development) will often
miss the critical impact of policy actions (or non-action) on
other important and relevant development issues.
Thesis Supervisor:
Professor Lisa R. Peattie
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, M.I.T.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
point of departure
the hypothesis
reason for the enauiry
methodology
empirical materials
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POINT OF DEPARTURE
A preliminary investigation on the social and economic
environment and the economic activities of the inhabitants of
an old resettlement est'nte in Hong Kong (Shekeipmei) revealed
the following.
A large concentration of low and medium skill labor having
the following characteristics:
2
a4 urban experience of some kind,
3
b. willingness to work long and irrgular hours,
4
c. willingness and capability to acquire occupational skills,
d. willingness to work in factories as well as in own
dwellings, and
e. approval of children and housewives to work in industries
constituted a special kind of labor supply which was particularly
useful for a pattern of industrial development which hpd
a. long hours and/or irregular shifts,
6
b. dispersed yet coordinated production processes, and
c. large number of individual establishments with small
7
scale operation.
Such labor supply seemed to have a certain "monopolistic"
8
advantage over other sources of labor supply.
These industrial types, due probably to external economies,
tended to aggregate. They tended to locate near their labor
supply sources. There seemed to be an symbiotic relationship
existing between the industries and their labor supply. They
9
both "grew" on each other. When the industries began to be
replaced by more modernized, mechanized and systemized modes
of production the labor supply was replaced by a younger, better
educated amd more mobile labor force.
THE HYPOTHESIS
The research is an attempt to test the hypothesis that
for certain manufacturing industries in a developing economy
the logic of their micro-urban location requires them to place
their production sites at sources of labor supply viz-a-viz at
market or other factors of production.
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REASON FOR THE EQIRY
The research is part of an overall effort to
a. re-examine the meaning of the housing process in economic
and social development.
b. challenge the conventional wisdom of public intervention
in housing as to render it relevant and useful in a
development context.
One area of investigation is the relationships between the
housing (urbanization) process and manpower mobilization in
developing economies.
Manpower mobilization in this context includes the mobili-
zation of the labor force of all skill and education levels and
demographic descriptions as well as the conventional meaning of
traning and development of occupational skills. The housing
process on the policy level includes the production, distribution
and consumption of housing the corresponding socio-economic im-
plications for the society in general and for the people housed
in particular.
It has been demonstrated that the problem of housing for
the urban poor is a problem of poverty where the physical conditions
of housing is only one of the many symptoms (and cause for further
poverty). Improvement in the physical conditions of the dwelling
place are often irrelevant and sometimes contrary to the cause
of poverty which public intervention in housing is supposed to
help to eliminate.
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The problem with poverty for an individual is the lack of
income or lack of ability and opportunity to realize income.
Housing as a social welfare undertaking does not intend to enhance
his chance to obtain income. The most it does is to make his
poverty less unbearble. Therefore if one looks at housing for
the poor as only a social welfare undertaking one necessarily
finds housing drains away resources from other productive sectors.
The conventional equation for housing is one of economic cost
and social benefit. Social cost and economic benefit are seldom
examined.
The housing process can contribute to economic grwoth (for
the individual and for the society) through its effects on
employment, skill training, labor supply reservoir for other
economic activities and other on-site productive functions. The
housing process can be important in mobilizing the most abundant,
yet often neglected resource in developing countries --- the
human resources.
It has been recognized that the mobilization and development
of manpower in developing countries is not only vital to economic
growth but also essential to the sustenance of a social environment
conducive to economic growth. Idle labor is ostentatiously
undesirable socially as well as economically. The sheer volume
of the potential labor force is enough to warrant a most sensitive
and responsive development policy. A comprehensive and responsible
development policy should integrate its manpower mobilization and
development strategy with the overall resource mobilization policy.
A practical and realistic manpower strategy should aim not only
-7-
at short-term goals such as temporary reduction of unemployment
but also at development of skilled and motivated labor force at
the right place, the right time and in the right scale for overall
economic growth.
This research chooses to look at the location relationship
between certain industries and. their labor supply in order to
understand how the housing process may affect the supply of labor
for economic activities outside housing construction.
-8-
METHODOLOGY
This is basically a case study of the location of manufac-
turing industries in Hong Kong. Two industries are chosen ---
the shirt and plastic-ware manufacturing industries. Two time
periods are selected for examination --- the early to mid 50's
and the late 60's.
The time period of the early to mid 50's is chosen because
it represented a very definite stage of socio-economic development
in Hong Kong. It was a period of massive immigration and industrial
take-off. The experience of Hong Kong, though unique in itself,
was similar in many respects to that of other developing regions
undergoing similar processes of economic and social change. If
Hong Kong's model of development can be useful in any way to other
countries the early development of its industries can offer impor-
tant clues of its success.
The late 60's in Hong Kong was a period of renewed expecta-
tions --- the children of. refugees had become young men and women
with different education levels, cultural values, and mobility
than their parents. It was a period of foreign restriction for
the older industries and expansion for the new ones. It was a
period of direct investment of multi-national corporation from
the outside and consolidation, merging and diversification from
the inside. All in all the period after the civil disturbance
in 1967-68 (corresponding to the Cultural Revolution in China)
marked a very different Hong Kong than the one existed before 1967.
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The two industries are chosen because they represented the
typical industrial opportunities available to entrepreneurs
in Hong Kong. The shirt and plastic manufacturing industry were
introduced in the early 50's and prospered during the 50's and
60's. Although new industries began to appear (e.g. electronic
assembly, tourism) these two industries still formed a major
portion of the gross national product and employed large Volumes
of labor in the late 60's.
The production processes and labor requirements of these
industries are studied. The logic of location of the production
sites is examined and tested with data of the actual location
patterns.
The following imethodology will be used.
1. Critical review of the relevance and adequacy of the
assumptions and theorectical framework of traditional
theories of industrial firm location to explain the logic
of manufacturing location in a micro-urban developing
economy context.
2. The case study.
For each of the two time periods chosen the following
will be studied.
a. general socio-economic background:
This includes the pattern of urbanization, the demo-
graphie and personal characteristics of the labor force
and the pattern of industrialization.
b. production process and labor requirements of the
industries:
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This includes the production and marketing operation
of the industries, the process of manufacture and the
labor requirements in terms of type, quantity and
quality of labor.
c. logic of location of manufacturing sites from the
perspective of the entrepreneur:
This includes considerations of market, input factors
(raw materials, capital, land, transportation and
labor) and external economies of scale and agglomeration.
d. empirical evidence of the pattern of location:
This includes the existing pattern of factory location
as well as the pattern of potential location demand.
The conditions of each of the critical factors identified
in c. at each location will be examined.
e. verification of the logic of location by the empirical
evidence and identification of the dynamic relationship
between labor and the production process.
3. Examination of the relationship between the process of
industrialization and the pattern of urbanization (housing)
and investigation of policy implications in light of the
findings.
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EMPIRICAL MATERIALS
1. Interviews.
In-depth interviews covering
A. Entrepreneurs who were engaged in the manufacturing
industries (shirt and plastic) in the early 50's and
the late 60's:
These included owners of small to medium size factories
from different branches of the industries.
a. decision criteria for entry into and exit from the
industries
b. description of business operation and practices
c. production processes and labor requirements
d. description of types and qualities of labor employed,
including where the labor came from
e. location consideration --- factors, priorities
and trade-offs
B. Workers who were, or had been engaged in the industries:
a. economic, social and physical considerations in
choice of factories (industries)
b. job description
c. preferences of location of "work place"
C. Industrial building developers:
They were not interviewed for the purpose of this
research. These interviews were conducted for the
purpose of real-estate development by the author
-12-
while working as an architect in Hong Kong.
a. types of industrial space --- size, facilities,
building types (high-rise flatted factory vs
uni-purpose factory)
b. location demands for the different types of
industrial space
c. development implication of industrial land-use
control
d. industrial development pattern and potential
differences between Hong Kong island and Kowloon
D. Labor Department officials:
a. labor laws especially child labor and female labor
laws
b. industrial description and classification
c. labor statistics
E. Housing Department officials:
a. housing statistics
b. criteria for choice of housing project location
Interviews were conducted by the author and his relatives
who were also engaged in the industries. Informants were
not selected by random sampling. They were acquaintances
and their connections. But care had been exercised to
include all different types and sizes of factories and
business operation in the industries. About 10 entrepre-
neurs were interviewed for each of the industries. About
5 workers were interviewed for each of the industries.
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2. Census and related studies.
A. Government of Hong Kong:
a. general census data
b. industrial, labor and trade statistics
c. descriptions and informations of urbanization,
industrialization and social development
B. University of Hong Kong:
sociological and architectural studies on squatter
settlements and resettlement estates in Hong Kong island
and Kowloon
C. The Chinese University of Hong Kong:
sociological and economic study on Kwun Tong --- the
first industrial town
D. United Nations High Commission on Refugees:
demographic and personal characteristics of refugees and
their locations of concentration
E. Surveys by the Far Eastern Economic Review and
Wah Kiu Yat Po:
a. general physical, social and economic background
b. industrial and trade and labor statistics and descrip-
tions
e. information on urbanization, industrialization and
social development
3. Personal contacts and observations.
A. 1955-1958 while living in a sauatter area (Shekeipmei)
and-working in one branch of the plastic industry
(used material reprocessing)
B. 1958-1973 while living in the immediate area of
squatter and resettlement areas in private tenaments
or in low-cost housing projects for the low-income.
-15-
CHAPTER 2: CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEORIES
OF LOCATION
introduction and definitions
critique of the theories '
the minimum cost approach
the maximum market area approach
the marginal location approach
the behavioral approach
conclusion
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Theories of location of industries have been developed
by economists and urban geographers to explain the logic of
location and the inter-relationship between land and industry.
They can broadly be classified into 3 groups according to their
concerns.
1. those that seek to understand the social and economic
implication (e.g. migration, employment, linkages etc.)
1
of particular industries at particular locations.
2. those that describe past and/or present location systems
2
and to predict possible location trends.
3. those that seek to optimize production and delivery
cost of industries, and those that seek to optimize
3
the market areas.
In this research we are interested in how theories explain
the logic of location of "labor-intensive" "secondary manufacturing"
industries in a micro-urban developing economy context. The
perspective of the entrepreneurs is adopted in the evaluation
of the location factors. The above classification is a functional
classification and theories do overlap in their functions. The
first two groups are positively policy-oriented in the sense
that they adopt a priori the perspective of the policy makers
and operate on a scale not normally within the grasp of the
individual entrepreneurs. The third group of theories seek to
explain the logic of location from the perspective of the entre-
preneurs, and will therefore be examined in detail in this
Chapter
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In order to limit the evaluation of the theories to issues
relevant to the research terms concerning the scope and nature
of the investigation must be first defined. These are
1. labor-intensive industries,
2. secondary manufacturing industries, and
3. urban areas in developing countries.
1. labor-intensive industries
labor cost
Industries with high total production cost ratios or
high labor cost per unit output ratios are traditionally
capital cost per unit output
classified as being labor intensive.
Labor intensity is a relative concept. It depends on
the price of labor and the price of other inputs, as
well as the volume of labor used. In developing countries
where the perceived scarcity of capital and abundance of
labor reduce the relative price of labor. It can be
argued that labor productivity is lower in developing
countries. But this is a misinterpretation because the
productivity of labor is a measure of the labor cost to
capital cost ratio in production. If productivity is
low the ratio is low. But if price of capital is high,
as often is the case in developing countries the
labor cost ratio comparison (i.e. productivity compari-
capital cost
son) between more developed countries where capital cost
is low and labor cost high and developing countries
where capital cost is high and labor cost low becomes
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irrelevant. Of course this is a much simplified argu-
ment, but it nevertheless indicates the weakness of the
concept as traditionally defined.
Labor intensity by the volume of labor employed can be
a more appropriate measure depending on where and how it
is used. In this research the hypothesis to be tested
involves industries which supposedly employ large volumes
of labor per unit production, whether in terms of number
of labor or man-hour input to produce a unit value of
output. labor cost ratio per unit value of output is
capital cost
not of primary importance in the analysis. In fact
in certain industries where labor cost is high such ascapital costishgsuha
in R. & D. and other technologically advanced industries
or service industries the labor consideration will be
quite different from that to be tested in the research.
In this research emphasis will placed on industries that
have high labor coat per unit value of output and employ
large volumes of labor.
2. secondary manufacturing industries
These are manufacturing industries using products of
. other primary manufacturing industries as raw materials.
. Their outputs are usually finished products ready for
consumption (as defined conventionally).
a. The apparel industry uses cloths which are made from
cotton. Cloth is at least two. stages (weaving, spinning)
away from cotton growing and processing which is a
primary agricultural industry.
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b. The plastic industry uses polystyrene which is made
as a petroleum bi-product. It is at least one stage
(petrochemical processing) away from the extracting
and refining of petroleum which is a primary extracting
industry.
The manufacturing process may (though not necessarily)
increase the bulk (e.g. funiture from wood or rattan,
bread from flour). It does not normally add weight to
the raw materials.
The size of the individual firm to be investigated will
be restricted. The research will concentrate on firms
whose sizes in terms of capital investment, employment
and physical size are such that no individual firm or
combination of a small number of firms can effectively
alter the physical, economic and social environment
within which they locate. In other words they can only
respond individually to the macro productive environment.
Whether or not they are classified as "formal" or
"informal" industries is of no consequence.
3. urban areas in developing countries
This working definition refers to geographic areas which
have high concentration of population measured in number
as well as in density, and with a non-agricultural charac-
ter. Most cities in developing countries will qualify
for this definition. Significant variations in the
quality of urban infrastructure and facilities are anti-
cipated. This research will consider only micro-urban
and not regional locations.
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There are four distinct schools of theories of industrial
firm location.
1. the minimum production and delivery cost approach
2. the maximum market area approach
3. the marginal location approach
4. the behavioral approach
The review includes discussions on the following.
1. basic assumptions and the analytical framework of the
theories
2. their relevance to the issues of concern in the research
3. their operational feasibility in a developing economy
context
4. the possibility of relaxation of basic assumptions
and/or analytical logic to better explain the location
phenomena in a micro-urban developing economy context
Illustrative diagrams are taken from R.C. Riley: Industrial
Geography, London, Chatto & Windus, 1973.
-21-
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1. the minimum cost approach (Alfred Weber to Edgar Hoover)
A. the theory
This school stresses the need to minimize cost, especially
transport cost, while assuming that price and demand are
7
not significant in themselves. The theory was first develop-
ed in the late 19th Century and the early 20th Century in
Europe and America amid an enviornment of rapid industrial
transformation from the earlier manufacturing to heavily
capitalized and mechanized operations (e.g. steel, coal,
aluminum extraction and processing, and the automobile
industry), where value to weight ratios were usually low.
It is an attempt to construct a general "pure theory"
of location. Three factors are emphasised --- transport
8 9
cost, labor cost and agglomeration effect. Transport cost
is considered the most important single determinant providing
the basic orientation of the industries, with labor costs
as the "first distortion" and agglomeration effect from
external economies as the "second distortion".
The following assumptions are adopted.
a. Within an area cultural, economic (including technology)
and political systems are uniform.
b. Material and energy sources are predetermined.
c. Points of consumption are predetermined,i.e. each
producer seels to one given market.
d. Distribution of labor with fixed (not equal) wages
at different location is given. Supply of labor at
fixed cost is unlimited. Labor is completely immobile.
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e. Transport costs are a function of weight and distance
(size of shipment, nature of goods, characteristics
of terrains are handled by adjusting the transport
cost).
The exercise is to discover the least transport cost
10
location for one product and one plant. Isotims are
geographic cost contours drawn by joining points of equal
transport cost for an equal unit to be transported. They
are drawn from sources of raw material and market (location
predetermined). These different sets of isotims are oom-
bined to form isodapanes (see diagram below),which are cost
contours drawn by connecting points representing equal
"combined" costs derived from the different isotims. The
least cost isodapane represents the best location set.
Often the lepst cost isodapane is at sources of raw materials
or markets. The distortions of labor and agglomeration
are then added on the isodapane system as distortions to
be modified.
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B. evaluation of the theory
This is a highly mechanistic model and has been severely
criticized. The following are some general criticisms.
a. It requires graphical or analog methods for solution,
since the determination of the minimum transport cost
point in a location polygon does not submit to straight-
forward analytical methods.
b. Transport cost is often determined more by transporta-
tion networks and nodes than by pure geometry, as
11
suggested by the theory.
c. It disregards institutional factors, especially
government actions, which are important to location.
d. The agglomeration effect assumption is too simplistic
in that industries "necessarily" move and combine at
a common segment formed by the geometrical intersection
of the isodapanes.
e. The assumption of limitless demand and non-fluctuating
price is unrealistic.
It must be emphasised that the theory was developed to
explain the regional location of heavy extracting or primary
manufacturing industries'where transport cost of material
and finished product was the most important vrriable given
the rigid production methods and factor endowment assump-
tions. Its relevance in explaining the location of non-
primary manufacturing industries in a micro-urban context
in developing economies is severely restricted.
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a. Some assumptions are more realistic in a micro-urban
context than in the larger regional context which the
theory is supposed to deal with --- such as economic
and political uniformity and predetermined material
resource and energy sources. But heterogenity of
certain other location factors are magnified on the
micro-urban level, especially for small scale manu-
facturing industries --- such as the supply and cost
of labor and land, and the distribution of transporta-
tion and agglomeration. Such location variations
have no transport cost significance but are more
relevant to micro-urban considerations.
b. The transport cost of materials and products depends
on the distance between destinations, the number of
breaking points and the freight structure. Their
micro-urban variation is not likely to have signifi-
cant impact on the total production cost. Transporta-
tion concerns of labor mobility and communication with
economic intellegence centres may be of more relevant
concern.
c. The relevance of transport cost in industries of
high labor content is further reduced because transport
cost is usually marginal to the total production cost.
This is especially true in developing economies where
urban manufacturing industries are largely labor-
intensive.
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Transportation allows the opening up of cheaper land at
the urban fringe, gives acces to the economic intellegence
system of the city, and permits the tapping of a wider
range of labor and material resources and market. For
the urban manufacturing entrepreneurs availability of proper
transportation is often a basic necessity for production.
This is even more important in developing countries where
transportation networks (for goods and personnel) may be
developed quite unevenly within the same metropolitan area.
The cost of transportation is only secondary because it
is likely to be only marginal to the total cost of produc-
tion. These entrepreneurs are unable to provide their
own transportation network if such is not given as infra-.
structure. Cost of transportation is only a monor consider-
ation once it becomes availabe.
However, it should be recognized that transportation is
not the only, or even the chief variable in consideration
of labor mobility at constant price in developing countries.
There are cultural, social and institutional variables
which may exert far greater force than transportation
availability and cost.
This theory considers only the cost side of the equation
It deals with regional differences in natural endowment, labor
and agglomeration. Location options are separated over
large distances, where transport cost is a significant ahare
of the-production cost. The theory is unsuitable to address
the issues of concern in this research. Even if the
assumptions are accepted (they are not) the theory has to
be rejected on its analytical capacity. Its dependency
on transport costs makes it impossible to analyse situations
where transport cost is only marginal and the substitut-
ability caprcity of transportation for other factors is
restricted.
-27-
12
2. the maximum market area approach (Frank A. Fetter to
August Losch1 3
A. the theory
This is a theory based on the behavioral assumption of
maximizing market area to maximize profit under constraints
of production costs and transport costs.
Instead of Weber's search for lowest cost location1iosch
claims that greatest profit can be achieved by ascertaining
what production costs will be at various locations, and
establishing the maximum size of market area which can be
controlled at those various locations. Losch accepts the
importance of production cost but does not incorporate
spatial variation in production cost i.e. his basic model
assumes a homogeneous land surface.
The analytical framework consists of the creation of the
"demand cones" and then the Loschian "landscape".
-28-
Several important assumptions are involved here.
a. The Loschian landscape is a uniform plain with uniform
natural endowment and transportation surface and
uniform tastes and consumption power.
b. Market competition occurs only along the boundary of
market areas and not inside the boundary --- mono-
polistic competition.
e. The price system should reflect adequately at least
a partial equilibrium system. The total Loschian
a: landscape refleots a general equilibrium.
d. There is the implicit assumption of necessary com-
petition in a locational sense among industries
producing the same goods.
Instead of using the traditional price and consumption
volume relationship he hypothesises a quantity-ofLgoods
salable at each distance to transport cost scaled to reflect
distance relationship.(see diagram above) The theory of
of deriving market boundaries as a set of breaking points
in a "gravitational" model was first proposed by Schaffle
in 187 d.5 Using the ouantity of goods to distance curve
it is then able to rotate the distance axis to form a
"demand cone". (see diagram above) Each demand cone
represents the optimal market area of one firm selling one
product. Different market areas can be delineated for
different firms selling the same product. A system of
interlocking market areas in the shape of hexagons will
represent the optimal market capacities of the firms.
-29-
This produces a partial Loschian landscape. When location
patterns of different industries and urban functions are
introduced, superimposing one upon the other and reconciling
their centres and boundaries with one another a total
Loschian landscape is produced.
B. evaluation of the theory
If the theory is used to explain the location of certain
industrial type by adopting the partial equilibrium frame-
work there is some validity of its descriptive power.
But in extending the theory to a general equilibrium system
the theorectical and computational difficulty is unsur-
36
mountable. The following are some general critiques of
the partial equilibrium model for a single industry.
a. With some modification the simplistic assumptions
on uniformity can be relaxed to represent a better
view of reality. But such relaxation is extremely
limited unless the coherence of the analytic structure
becomes so weakened as to produce highly unstnble
and unrelated "demand cones".
b. The assumption of competition at the margin is
unrealistic. The price structure of most industries
hardly reflects this. Competition occurs not only
at the edge of market areas but extends far into the
territories of the competitors.
a. The equilibrium (partial) price system poses problems
for multi-locational consideration. The price system
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must be solved before price relationships (equalities
and inequalities) can be established. The pure
analytics of marginalism cannot suffice computation-
ally as well as deductively to deal with such systems.
d. This is a market-oriented approach assuming rigid
production cost structure and no economies of scale.
e. Even the amount of information required to produce
a partial Loschian landscape is formidable (e.g.
market capacity and size, price variation over distance,
amount of salable goods over distance etc.) for a
single entrepreneur to handle. Besides much of it
has to be obtained from competitors.
This theory deals with market areas and offers an
alternative approach to industrial location decision. But
again transport cost is the major variable in determining
the optimal market size. As such the same criticism of
dependency on transport cost as in the case of the "minimum
cost" approach can be applied here.
There is also the implicit assumption -that production
and distribution are taking place simultaneously at the
same location, and that market areas contract or expand
according to the condition (intensity) of competition.
But if industries do not distribute products directly to
consumers then market consideration becomes the concern
of the distributors. For example, if plastic utensils
are distributed through retail outlets which sell other
goods as well, then the location of the plastic factory
-31-
has no direct relationship to the market area of the
plastic utensils. The nature of competition of the
retailers selling different products is entirely different
from that assumed by the theory.
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3. the marginal location approach (E.M.Rawstron to D.M.Smith)
A. the theory
The proponents of this school are mainly geographers
who regard Hoover and Losch (the two former schools) as
lacking in reality and of being concerned with ideal
locations. This approach stresses that entrepreneurs
locate for many different reasons which conflict with the
least cost or maximum market theories. They contend that
for most entrepreneurs there are only areas within which it
is possible to make a profit, and other areas within which
losses are incurred. It stresses the identification of
margins i.e. zones in which profit changes to losses and
vice versa.
The theory examines the structure of costs and their
19
variation through space. It assumes that when at least
one of the components in the cost structure (the components
being labor, material, market, land, capital and energy)
varies appreciably from place to place, and if this
variation form a large proportion of the total cost, then
this component becomes the binding constraints of location.
20
Space-cost curves are constructed to obtain the margin
of profitability. Cost and price are allowed to fluctuate.
Managerial skill, taxation etc. which affect price and
cost can be introduced into the cost or price structure.
The profit zone is indicated by the area between the
"margins". (see diagram)
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B. evaluation of the theory
This is a more realistic and flexible approach which
acknowledges that entrepreneurs operate without sufficient
information, and in non-perfect competition. But never-
theless it is a variation on the same theme as the previous
two approaches in that distance was taken as the major
variable in the cost structure. The following general
criticism have been levelled against this approach.
a. The more realistic and flexible the theory is the
less vigorous it becomes. It lacks the positivistic
appeal of the two former approaches.
b. It still assumes a cuasi-linear relationship between
cost and distance. It is not clear how distances
relate to the spatial aspect of the urban structure
in the analytical framework.
c. It is a difficult theory to operate even though it
does not require to pin-point the optimal location.
By accepting intangible constraints such as managerial
skill, and institutional factors etc. quantification
becomes impossible.
d. The average cost curve still requires much information
to construct.
It accepts the non-substitutability of location variation
in production cost and revenue by transportation i.e. factor
immobility is allowed. The analysis of the cost structure
makes explicit the importance of certain production factors.
Although it is not always true that the factors which
share a large portion of the total cost are critical
factors in location consideration this is definitely an
improvement over the assumption that transport cost is
necessarily the important factor. The recognition of the
inter-relatedness of the factors in the cost structure is
an important contribution because the analysis allows for
changes in the cost structure and changes in the relative
importance of the factors (unlike the other approaches
which allow only changes in modes of transportation and
freight rates).
Instead of pin-pointing location the analysis prescribes
a range of areas. But in a micro-urban context, as well
as in the regional context, thresholds of factor cost or
revenue must be recognized. There is no necessary continuity
of cost structure within the geographical margins of a
"profit zone" or a "loss zone". Factor costs may change
drastically over administrative boundaries (e.g. tax
structure) or over socio-economic boundaries (labor cluster)
or over geographic boundaries (e.g. natural barriers).
These boundaries do not always coincide. The average cost
curve is therefore not necessarily continuous over distances
as suggested by the theory.
A more realistic description will be a range of location
options, not necessarily related in any geographical sense,
with similar average cost curve and price curve. The
average cost curve and price curve in each option has to
be computed separately, taking into consideration the cost
-035-
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structure and factor costs appropriate at each location.
In other words the cost-distance relationship should be
replaced by a cost-location relationship. The geographic
margins defining profit or loss zones are fussy and there
can be more than one profit or loss zone. There is a
range of possible location options with no distance rela-
tionship among them.
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4. the behavioral approach (Allan Pred)
A. the theory,
This is an attempt to explain industrial location
through the human factor --- a psychological approach.
It regards subjective attitude that different people have
about all aspects of life as a vital part of the study of
industrial location. It rejects the assumption of the
classical "rational economic man" and replaces him by indi-
viduals making decision in light of information availnble
and in manner related to their own ability to use that
information. The economic man is a "satisficer" rather
than an "optimizer".
. The entrepreneur is perceived as a function of a range
of psychological factors --- aspiration experience, age,
social and economic contacts, education level, emotional
stability etc. The theory contends that as industries
become more and more footloose the behavioral influence in
siting becomes more relevant and important. -The beha-o
22
vioral matnix>(.see diagram) relates the amount and quality
of information and the ability to use the information
by the firm. Firms on the lower right sector have higher
probability to locate at the more optimal location. Firms
on the top left sector are least equipped to make the
right (profitable) decision.
-38-
B. evaluation of the theory
This may be a good descriptive model of how entrepre-
neurs are supposed to have worked but as far as how entre-
preneurs should work the theory offers little help. This
may provide interesting insight into the decision-making
mechanism of location but it does not offer operational
suggestions as to what should be done if the entrepreneur
wishes to optimize his goals (however defined).
Quality of information and ability to use it are
relative concepts within a given context. It is self-
fulling prophecy to construct a matrix from observations
made on the existing pattern of location. Such observa-
tions will necessarily confirm the hypothesis that firms
had better information and were more able to use it
located at better locations.
As far as developing countries
are concerned the theory is even SENAVtoRAL MAfRiX
less useful because footloose indus-
tries (industries with high-level g "Los PR~u
manpower, and little dependency on
natural resources, transportation
and labor) implied in the theory are
rare. Input factors for production
and market concerns are still the AilLifi (na "~4
more important considerations.
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CONCLUSION
Traditional location theories deal primarily with regional
23
variations in production costs and market areas. Most of them
were developed in the late 19th and early 20th Century to
analyse heavy or primary industries --- steel, coal, automobile
etc. Transportation was the major concern. In the pursuit
of pure general theories reality had been sacrificed. Many
of the assumptions are far too simplistic to be useful. Even
in the area of regional analysis the theories have not been
proven very useful. This is evidenced by:(a) extension and
modification of the theories and formulation of new theories
have not been undertaken vigorously by scholars since the 1930's,
and (b) little empirical studies have been carried out to
validate the theories because it has been difficult to generate
24
testable hypotheses.
When the theories are applied in a micro-urban scale to
explain secondary manufacturing industrial locations where
variation in transport costs is not significant and transport
cost is only marginal to the overall production cost they become
even less useful.
When labor factor is concerned the following important
considerations are overlooked by all location theories.
1. heterogenity of the labor supply
There is heterogenity in the availability and cost of
labor in a micro-urban context. This is partly due to the
imperfection of the labor market (e.g. variations in inform-
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ation diffusion processes, recruitment methods, labor
price structure etc.). But most important of all it is
the inherent differences in cultural values and norms
and economic rationality of each of the labor groups
(according to age, sex, education, ethnicity etc.) that
account for the different levels and modes of participation
in economic activities. Entrepreneurs accept these
"imperfections" as given and try to cope with them prag-
matically. Economists, and to some extent planners, tend
to start off with perfect condition.
2. dynamics of the production process and labor quality
and quantity
a. time dynamics
Economic, social and cultural conditions are changing
constantly. The pace and nature of change is much
faster and more drastic in many developing countries
than in the developed ones. Part of the reason may be
that industrialization in developed countries has been
completed and new frontiers are still not in sight.
Education and industrialization in developing countries
are changing rapidly the skill and expectation of the
labor force. Production processes and labor specifica-
tions have to be revised constantly to keep pace with the
general development of the country. Industries (or
production processes) which cannot keep up with the social
and economic development of the country will have to be
discarded altogether. A vivid example is the "labor-
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intensive" semi-mechanized apparel industry. In the
late 40's Japan began to take over from places like
New York in the manufacture of medium to low price
apparels. In the late 50's when Japan moved onto more
sophisticated modes of production made possible by
technological advancement as well as by improved ability
of the work force this industry moved to Hong Kong.
The same phenomenon was repeated in the early 70's when
the same industry began to move from Hong Kong to Taiwan
and Korea.
b. cross-sectional dynamics
Factors for production is not a static concept.
There is ,no factor of production if there is no produc-
tion. Consider the labor input inAhe production of
shirts in the early 50's in Hong Kong. The sewers of
shirts were mainly housewives who worked in their own
homes, and used their own sewing machines. When the
first shirt manufacturing factories were formed there
were no housewife-sewers. But when large volumes of
demand came housewives were recruited. If a survey of
potential labor force for the shirt industry was taken
before the housewives actually joined the labor force
in large volume it would indicate that the labor force
would not support the phenomenal growth of the shirt
industry. The volume of labor is therefore a dynamic
and relative concept. Jobs create labor. To calculate
the volume of labor supply by counting heads of the
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"working age" population is misleading. The volume
of labor depends on the labor content of the job, the
accessibility of the job and the "attractiveness" of
the job, all of them relative to the macro social and
economic environment.
In a micro-urban context the entrepreneur may not always
locate at the best site ink terms of labor or any other factor.
Choice of location in the urban areas is severely limited. The
appropriate location does not come easily and.competition is
keen especially when choice of sites is limited. Even if he
does locate at the optimal location the quality of the location
or the production process may change thus dissolving the location-
industry match. The entrepreneur is concerned in locating at
a "profitable" area, and not necessarily the "most profitable"
location.
Two criteria for production location selection are important:
(a) availability of "acceptable" production factors and market,
and (b) cost of the production factors and marketing.
His first consideration is the market and production factor
quality offered by a particular location. Only after this can
he consider the costs. Since he has no capacity to affect
the economic and social environment of a location his choice is
to accept or reject locations with the environments as given.
Location options are highly restricted in urban areas
because of the density and compactness of development. Land
and infrastructure is totally immobile. There is only a
limited number of choices. The entrepreneur is interested
only in those location where factors appropriate to his use
are available to him. His first job is therefore to identify
the locations with acceptable factor availability. Then he
will examine the location variations in cost and revenue.
Markets and production factors are much less mobile in a developing
economy. Substitutability through transportation is not often
feasible. Instead of locating at the optimal location with
the best combined cost and revenue the entrepreneur often has
to locate at: the most crucial factor.
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This Chapter looks at the shirt and plastic mnnufacture
industry of the early to mid 50's in Hong Kong.
Section 1:background
It deals with the general physical, social and economic
background of the time with special emphasis on the
influx of refugees from China and the start.of indus-
trialization in Hong Kong.
Section 2: the industries
This looks at the two industries ---their general business
operation and practices, and their production processes
and labor requirements.
Section 3: logic of location
This section investigastes the logic of location.
Each location factor is evaluated from the perspective
of the entrepreneur.
Section 4: empirical observations
This section looks at the pattern of factory location
to identify the critical location factors.
Section 5: conclusion
This section draws conclusions on the importance of
the labor factor in location decision.
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND
A. Hong Kong --- the place
The total area was roughly 398 square miles of which 82%
was marginal land, 13% arable and only the remaining 5% built.
The Colony could be divided into three parts --- the island of
Hong Kong (29 sq.mi.), Kowloon and New Kowloon (35 sq.mi.), and
the New Territories including some 235 islands (334 sq.mi.).
a. The island of Hong Kong was steep and rugged with a
spine of hills. Victoria, the name given to its trad-
ing post when the Colony had been first founded, was
still the main business centre. Because of the sharply
rising ground, much of Victora was built on reclaimed
land. Many of its side streets were stepped.
b. Across the harbor to the north wis the ceded territory
of Kowloon, and New Kowloon. The land was generally
flat rising to the foothills to the north. Here were
the wharves, the railway terminus to China and the
airport. On here and on the northern coastal strip of
the island (i.e. 13 square miles around the h-rbour)
lived 80% of the population --- some 2 million by 1955.
C. Behind Kowloon, a range of steep hils divided the
bustling urban area from the placid New Territories.
The greater part of the New Territories, both island and
mainland, was steep and barren. For the most part, the
area remained unspoiled and the lives of the inhabitants
of the small isolated villages were serenely rural.
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B. the people
The total population in Hong Kong before the Japanese
Occupation in 1941 was about 1,600,000. But at the end of the
War in 1945 the total was approximately 500,000. Then came
the rapid increase. By 1955 the total population was estimated
to be 2,500,000. The great majority of the people were Cantonese
(estimated to be 98% of the local population).
Most people lived in the urban areas lying on the north
and south of the harbor. Except for the few rich who could
afford to live in houses of their own most of the local inha-
bitants lived in "cubicles" in tenament houses. These were
small rooms (50 - 100 sq.ft. each) with wooden partitions.
Whole families lived in each of these cubicles. There could
be many cubicles in each floor. The urban areas were densely
packed, with average density for the low and medium income areas
at 500 persons per acre.
The working population was engaged in commerce and industry
though there were about 150,000 working in agriculture in the
New Territories. Most of the industries were small and owned
by Chinese entrepreneurs. The ordinary worker worked from
7 a.m. to 5 p.m. (with an hour off at mid-day) but extra work
from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. at ordinary wages was not uncommon. It
was a 7 day work-week.
C. the refugees
These included political and economic immigrants from
China during the period between 1945-1955.
Some half million refugees (22% of the total population
in 1954) came between 1949-1954. If people coming in after
1945 (end of the 2nd World War and beginning of drastic politi-
cal changes in China) were included the number reached one
million. However many of the refugees were not total stranger.
Approximately 45% of the inhabitants belonging to refugee fami-
lies were born in Hong Kong. Many had relatives and friends
in Hong Kong. When they arrived in Hong Kong they would stay
with their friends and relatives, or they would secure their
own shelter either in residential housing or in squatter areas.
(see maps for urban areas and refugee concentrations) Many
of them lived in the urban built-up areas in tenament houses.
But most of them (about 400,000) lived in squatter areas on
public land on the urban fringe, in the streets and on rooftops
of tenament houses.
The demographic characteristics of the refugees were
markedly different from those of the "local population". There
2
was a high proportion of adult males and single person house-
34
holds? Ethnicity pattern also changed and non-Cantonese found
it difficult to adapt to local conditions.
5
Unemployment was much higher in the refugee group. They
had, however, better educatio6 and much better professional
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and occupational skill. (see Table 1) These refugees also
brought in entrepreneur skill and capital. But they were
undergoing an occupation deterioration in which their income
and occupational status shifted downwards. (see Table 2)
7. ,
Dindustrialization
The Colony of Hong Kong had virtually no natural resources
other than the sheltered deep-water harbor, and a geographical
position favoring trade with South China and reasonably suited
to the role of a commercial centre serving the whole of the Far
East. Entrepot trade in goods moving to and from China was
its traditional livelihood. To serve that trade, banks,
insurance and shipping companies, dockyards, warehousing and
stevedoring companies had been built up and flourished.
Fluctuation in trading condition which occurred during 1930-40
was balanced by an ebb and flow of population to and from China,
the population adjusting itself to the prosperity of the times.
This convenient arrangement was suddenly upset by the advent of
political changes in China. These changes brought about one
million immigrants into the Colony in the Jeriod 1948-1950 and
at the same time, the Korean War resulted in an embargo on
trade with China to the great disadvantage of Hong Kong's
economic position.
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The influx of a great number of hard-working, adaptable
people and the fall in entrepot trade, together formed the base
and provided the stimulus from which Hong Kong's industry had
sprung.
Industry was a late starter in Hong Kong. Construction of
dockyards and sugar refineries, development of electric power
and the construction of the railway to China (canton) fromed the
foundation for industrial development. The Imperial Preference
in 1932 granting privileges to exports from Hong Kong to England
and the Commonwealth countries encouraged the development of
small manufacturing industries producing rubber footwear, textiles,
torches and metalware. The real industrial take-off did not
occur until the late 40's with the influx of population and
change in macro-economic conditions.
Industrial development in Hong Kong was handicapped by a
lack of level land, and the high cost of site formation in the
predominantly hilly terrain. Virtually all raw materials had
also to be imported and there were no protective tariffs behind
which local industry could shelter and develop on a firm basis
of internal consumption.
Offsetting these fundamental disadvantages was a large
working population, industrious and adaptable, allied with world-
market connections of the merchant community. Its government
was stable and orderly, and had attracted a heavy influx of
capital from pre-Communist China and the shaky regimes of South-
east Asia. Its banking, shipping and insurance services were
also efficient.
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SECTION 2: THE INDUSTRIES.
A. the industries
8
1. the shirt industry
Up to 1949 the industry was practically non-existent.
There were some under-garment manufacturing catering for
9
the local consumers and some Southeast Asian countries.
The first attempt was taged by refugee industrialists
to manufacture for export quality shirts on a large scale
for the high price market in U.K. and in Europe. This
attempt was not successful because foreign buyers found the
styles and workmanship not satisfactory. Moreover these
industrialists were Northerners and had the further problem
of recruiting local workers who did not speak their language.
The second and successful attempts were staged by the
local people and refugees from southern China, who had some
foreign connections. They were not industrialists but
merchants who were more accustomed to business negotiations
than to industrial organization. There were also entre-
preneurs who were former employees of the unsuccessful firms
(technicians, formen, skilled workmen, junior managers and
salesmen), who recognized the market potential and the
production problems. They started business with their own
personal. savings or pooling resources of friends and relatives.
They moved into the medium to low price products capable of
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being produced by local skill and were able to establish
foreign markets. Most entrepreneurs were small scale
6perators with only a few large factories.
The shirt manufacturing industry involved different
entrepreneurs. The following was a typical procedure of
how a shirt was manufactured.
An order was received from overseas buyers through
exporters specifying the quantity, stlye determined by
prior samples, workmanship, price and date of delivery.
The order often came in the form of a "letter of Cre-
dential" or L.C. It might come to the exporter form
or directly to the manufacturer,,which was much less
often. With the L.C. the manufacturer could borrow
cash from commercial banks and credits from material
suppliers. Payment was usually upon delivery and
credit from material supplier was 60 days. Orders
for the Christmas season (deadline October) and Easter
season (deadline January) could be substantial. These
were the hectic and profitable months. May to July
were the usual lean months.
When an exporter received an order he would either he
either give the whole order to a manufacturer of his
choice or split the order among different manufacturers.
The system of bidding for orders by the manufacturers
was based on competition as well as on personal connec
tions.
There were only a few large manufacturers who might
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receive orders disrectly. The medium and smaller
operators had to go through the exporters or through
some larger "parent" manufacturers., Upon receiving the
go-ahead signal they would purchase the necessary cloth
from suppliers. Supplies were normally delivered at
several stages in small quantities at each. delivery.
The usual set-up of a medium or small manufacturer with
less than 50 sewing machines was about 500 sq.ft. to
1,500 sq.ft. with cutting, inspecting, packing, storaging
and some sewing done in the premise. The cutter would
cut the cloth according to the specification of the
order and prior samples.. The different segments would
be sewn in the factory or contracted out to some sewer-
manufacturers or to individual sewers. There were
never enough sewers during the high seasons. During the
low seasons a number of sewers would be retained working
probably at reduced shifts. Except for the sample-
sewers all other sewers, whether working inside or
outside the factory, would be paid the same piece-wage.
Sewer-maunfacturers or individuals would come to the
factory to pick up the cut colths. They would then sew
these in their own premises with their own machines
(manually operated in the 50's) and return them to the
factory. These would be inspected and would either be
accepted or rejected to be modified. In the early 50's
the sewing would iclude the whole shirt although later
parts were more standardized and collars and cuffs were
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done separately. The sewn shirts would then have the
- button holes made and buttons sewn on by the button-and
hole manufacturer. Labels would then be put on and
collar stiffeners inserted in the factory. The shirts
would then be ironed and ppckaged (folded, stitched to
cradboard backers, and wrapped). They would be placed
into cardboard cartons. These would then be sent to
be packed in crates ready for shipment.
The different processes would involve the following dis-
tinct participants.
a. the exporter
b. the chief manufacturer whose label would be put on
the shirts (sometimes the labels of the buyer-dis-
tributor would be used)
c. the sewer-manufacturer or the individual sewers
d. the button-and-hole maunfacturer
e. the label manufacturer
f. the 6bllar stiffener manufacturer
g. the packer
h. the transporter
The major employers of labor were
a. the chief manufacturer, and
b. the sewer-manufacturer.
They accounted for up to 80% of total employment in the
industry.
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2. the plastic industry
The story of the development of the plastic industry
was similar to that of the shirt industry. The first
pioneering effort was for sophisticated products manufac-
tured in large and mechanized factories. But the success-
ful market went to the cheaper, smaller products.
Plastic wares were exported to East Africa and Southeast
Asia in the 50's. There were only a few large factories
(employing over 200) and a large number of smaller factories
(employing 20 or less). The most common product weighed
11
no more than 10 ounces and could be handled with manual
moulding machines.
The following was a typical procedure of plastic manu-
facture.
An order was received from oversea buyers through the
exporter specifying the quantity, price and delivery
date. Moulds would be designed in collaboration with
the metal would workers. Design was not an important
concern in the 50's because the plastic products
exported were ordinary utensils, beads and simple
toys to countries where design sophistication was not
a major marketing issue. The designs were standardized
to a large extent.
A typical medium to small scale manufacturer would have
some twenty moulding machines (either injection or ex-
trusion, though injection machines were more commonly
used in the early 50's) and would require about 1,000
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sq.ft. factory sp ce. All moulding was done in the
factory. But much work would be contracted out to
other manufacturers when the order became too large or
to urgent to be handled by one manufacturer. Competi-
tion for work was similar to that of.the shirt industry
i.e. by competitive pricing and personal relationship.
There was less seasonal fluctuation for smaller manufac-
turers which catered for the African and Southeast Asian
markets, although the few larger manufacturers catering
for the U.S. and European markets might have larger
fluctuations. The credit system was similar in both
the shirt and the plastic industry --- payment on delivery
12
and 60 days credit on materials. Raw materials were
either imported or reprocessed. Quantity of each purchase
could be quite small. New imported materials cost
more and usually required a longer delivery period and
a larger order each time. The moulding machine would
be operated 24 hours if necessary during periods of high
demand. The product might require more than one single
mould and more than one single moulding operation.
Often several identical pieces would be manufactured in
one mould. The pieces coming out from the mould would
be trimmed (with the trimming going to waste to be
recycled by other manufacturers). Sometimes touching
up jobs or assembly jobs would be required --- such as
painting, inserting and assembling. Other materials
might be required --- cloth, metal parts, machine parts
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or even motor for toys. Much of this assembly work
would be sent out to contractor manufacturers or to
individuals. For plastic toys the packaging would be
more elaborate and would involve designers and printers.
Daily utensils and wares would be packed in cartons
and then in crates.
Reprocessing raw materials was an important sub-industry
13
because of the size of employment. Raw materials for
reprocessing came from wastage in former manufacture.
Such wastage could be quite substantial. These would
be collected from manufacturers by special agents or sold
directly by the manufacturer to the reprocessor. But
the main source of waste came from foreign countries
(England and W. Germany). The reprocessing could be
quite elaborate. The plastic wastes would first be
separated from other alien materials such as metal and
fibre. It would then be washed in diluted caustic soda,
dried and assorted according to their colors and qualities.
These would be machine crushed, melted and mixed, and
ground to form reprocessed plastic grains to be sold to
plastic manufacturers.
The different processes would involve the following dis-
tinct participants.
a. the exporter
b. the raw material supplier (new and reprocessed)
c. the manufacturer where the plastic products were
moulded
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d. the mould maker
e. the assembler
f. the packer
g. the transporter
The major employers of labor were
a. the chief manufacturer,
b. the material reprocessor, and
c. the assembler.
They accounted for up to 80% of total employment in the
industry.
B. the production proces
These were new industries in Hong Kong and entrepreneurs
14
were concerned primarily with establishing the market. This
was a trial period by foreign buyers. There was no continuous
flow of orders and there was no second chance for-any failure
to meet the requirements of the orders. Capital supply was not
15
the major problem because the size of the orders were small.
This meant that large factories would not be needed. Given the
workmanship reauired by the middle and low price market there
was no lack of aggregate supply of labor (qualified unemployed
locals and refugees). Market consideration was therefore the
binding constraint in the design of the production process.
What was needed was high flexibility in meeting fluctuating
16 17
demands, speedy production in meeting short notice orders, and
smooth coordination among different entrepreneurs in the produc-
tion chain in meeting the order specifications.
According to some entrepreneurs operating in the early to
mid 50's the production process was defined in the following
mnnner. "Export market exploration by some enterprising entre-
preneurs revealed that medium and low.price products were market-
18
able. The initial ventures were modest in scale. These first
entrepreneurs used the existing labor skill employed either in
producing similar products for the local market or in supporting
19
or relpted industries. The first products which were successful
in the export market were simple and standardized in many respects.
These initial productions established the criteria for the standards
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of workmanship to follow. Other entrepreneurs, recognizing
the markets pioneered by those initial ventures, joined the
field. However, the basic production standards had already
been set and accepted by the export market. The main concern
was then to mobilize sufficient labor force to serve the repidly
expanding market."
1.flexibility of production
a. seasonality of demand
Fluctuation in the production process was a result
of the fluctuation in export demand. Seasonal fluctuat-
tion meant very different levels of production at differ-
ent times of the year. Manufacturers must be able to
accommodate very high levels of production during certain
periods of the year and also to maintain a basic main-
tenance level at other times.
b. competition for orders
The demand signal for production was further confused
by the pattern of distribution of export orders among
manufacturers. They must bid competitively and work
through personal relationships. Their fortune was
tied to that of the exporter. This required flexibility
of production on the part of the manufacturer. In order
to establish good working relationship with an exporter
the manufacturer must out-perform other competing manu-
facturers by both high quality of production and speedy
delivery. It has been remarked by foreign buyers that
- e -- -
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the success of the manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong was due largely to the near perfect record of
adherence to delivery deadlines as compa-red with the
records of other competing countries exporting similar
20
goods.
2. division of labor and standardization
This was a continuously'evolving process.
a. for the shirt industry
In the early 50's the sewing part of the whole shirt
was done by one operator with the exception of the
21
collar. This method appropriately exploited the
craftsmanship skill of the labor force and minimized the
need for process coordination. But speed and cost of
production were important consideration in the competi-
tion with other exporting countries. Later standardi-
zation brought about a more eleborate system of division
of labor. The trunk, sleaves, collar and cuffs were
separtely sewn.-
b. for the plastic industry
Due to the simplicity of the products division of
labor in the moulding process was not eleborate. Usually
a single operator did the moulding of the whole ware
which was usually simple (without many parts) and small
(1.5 - 8 ounces a piece). Other workers would do the
22
trimming and assembly, which were also -quite simple.
The division of labor was a more significant considera-
tion in the reprocessing of materials. There was no
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one standardized process and each operator had his own
method. But the products were standarized i.e. the
same quality of plastic materials were produced for use
by the moulder manufacturer.
3. quality control
Each entrepreneur in the production process chain
had independent operation and management methods. Quality
control of each intermediate product or process was
exercised by each entrepreneur internally. For work
done in the factory quality control would be exercised
through supervision and inspection. Entrepreneurs
could not afford to invest in on-the-job training for
the semi-skilled operations (e.g. sewing). Skill had
to be acquired through instructions by friends or relatives.
Work done outside the factory would have its quality
controlled through inspection and a prior demonstration
of skill and proficiency.
Entrepreneurs were subject to quality demands by
entrepreneurs on the next link of the production chain.
Such controls were exercised through the price system,
volume of order, rejection of products etc. The final
quality control was in the hands of the buyers who were
interested only in the final product.
4. process coordination
a. internal coordination at each entrepreneur
This depended on the complexity ofthe production process.
For the manufacturer with more elaborate production process
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(e.g. the chief manufacturer in the shirt and plastic
industry) internal process coordination usually followed
23
a crude "critical path" method with significant pre-
planning. However, plans were subject to drastic revi-
-- sions due to the fluctuat:ing nature of demands. Last
minute rush was not at all uncommon.
b. external coordination among entrepreneurs
This was a mojor concern for all entrepreneurs. This
would determine the quality, quality and timing of pro-
duction at each link. Normally this was a linear pro-
cess working towards the final product. But the market
could not reflect adequately the working of the process.
Competition in price was always distorted by human and
cultural factors inherited from the pre-industrialization
24
era (e.g. personal relationship).
Timing seemed to be most important factor in process
corrdination. Given the fluctuation in demand ad the
linear segmentation of production among fimms and indi-
viduals delays at any link of the production chain would
result in delays in the final delivery. Timing was the
essence of process coordination (given some basic
quality control), the production process and input
consideration had to be taylored to it.
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C. labor reguirements
Given the socio-economic conditions of Hong Kong in the
early 50's and the demographic and personal characteristics of
the refugees and the local population the most manipulable factor
25
for flexibility in production was labor. Flexibility in pro-
duction could be more readily achieved by maintaining a flexible
supply of labor with the proper skill mix (as opposed to, say,
supply of capital). High unemployment made it possible for
entrepreneurs to establish wage relationship best suited to
their purpose of flexibility. The degree of division of labor
and standardization depended on technology as well as the indus-
trial capability of the workers. Neither of these was well
26
developed in Hong Kong in the early 50's. Entrepreneurs had to
exploit other qualities of labor, such as skills of craftsmanship,
willingness to work under any circumstances etc. More stringent
demands on workers (e.g. irregular shifts, special skills etc.)
could also be exercised.. Entrepreneurs could even shift some
burden of capital investment and production space requirement onto
the workers by having them work with their own machines and in
their own homes. Urban and industrial experience of the popu-
lation made it possible for some industrial discipline to be im-
27
posed, especially in quality control and process coordination.
However these must be balanced against the skill and education
28
levels of the workers and the speed, quality and quality of
production demanded of them.
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The following is a desciription of the types of wage rela-
tionships and the quality and quantity of labor required by the
industries.
I. types of labor in terms of wage and employment relationship
29
a. "permanent" employees
These would include the basic maintenance and adminis-
trative staff, and some skilled workmen (e.g. cutter
and sample sewer in the shirt industry; mechanics -and
sample makers in the plastic industry). They were
offered permanent employment because (i) their loyalty
and dedication to the firm was important to the success
30 31
of the business, and (ii) competition for such personnel
was keen among firms. They were often relatives or
close friends of the employer and they might share some
profits in the form of bonuses or gratuities.
They were employed on a month-by-month basis, and they
32
often, though not always, lived at the factory premises.
They received either a fixed monetary wage or a combina-
tion of monthly wage and piece-wage (at reduced rate)
for products produced.
b. "temporary" employees33
These were employed on a day-to-day basis. No notice
would be required for dismissal. They were operators of
various kinds (e.g. sewers, ironers and packers etc.
in the shirt industry; machine operators, trimmers and
assemblers etc. in the plastic industry). They worked
-68-
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in the factory, usually in shifts. Piece-wage would
be paid. Their income therefore depended on their
proficiency if work was available. Notice for re-
cruitment were posted at the door of the factory or in
35
some public places. Most of the recruitment came
through personal references. Some demonstration of
skill was usually required before employment was offered.
36
c. piece-wage laborers working outside the factory
These were semi-skilled operators to low skill
laborers who did not work in the factory premises
(e.g. sewers in the shirt industry; assemblers, plastic
waste sorters and cleaners etc. in the plastic industry).
37
They came to the factory to collect materials and repre-
cessed them outside the factory premises --- in their
38
own homes or in some public space they could find. The
wage was based on the quantity of products produced.
The processed products would be delivered to the factory
and would be inspected before accepted, and paid. They
usually had friends or relatives working in the factory
where they collected work. They often worked for
different factories.
2- quality of labor
a. skills
As a general rule permanent employees were either
skilled workers at key positions in the production pro-
cess, or low-skill maintenance staff. Temporary and
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piece-wage workers were mostly medium-skill to low-
skill workers.
The definition of skill used here follow closely
those used normatively by entrepreneurs. However
there was general correlation of the skill levels
with (i) the period of apprenticeship or.learning re-
39
quired, (ii) the wage levels, and (iii) the"prestige"
accorded in the workplace.
The following is an illustration of the job content
of the typical high-skill, medium-skill and low-skill
jobs.
(i) high-skill - cutter in the shirt manufacturer:
His job was to cut (manually in the very early 50's
and with power-driven scissors during the mid 50's)
a stack of cloth into patterns that could be sewn
into trunks, sleaves, collars, cuffs etc. of
different sizes and styles of shirts. He was
supposed to make the most efficient use of the
cloth and should yield the least wastage. His
period of apprenticeship ranged from 5 to 8 years.
He was considered the most important person in the
shirt factory and received the highest pay.
(1i) medium-skill - manual machine operator in
the plastic manufacturer
His job consisted of setting and securing the
mould, setting the correct temperature for moulding,
putting the correct (approximately) quantity of
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plastic grains into the hopper of the machine,
operating the crank manually, opening the mould
and releasing the moulded plastic ware or parts.
His apprenticeship ranged from two weeks to 6
months depending on the complexity of the machine
and his learning capacity.
(iii) low-skill - washer and sorter in the plastic
waste reprocessing
His job consisted of making suitably diluted
caustic soda solution, removing metal, fibre and
other alien material from the plastic wastes,
scrubbing the plastic in the solution, rinsing and
letting the plastic to dry naturally (under the
sun if possible), and sorting out the different
colors and qualities into batches. No training
was reouired. In fact many children were employed.
Most workers were medium-skill workers. Their
apprentice period was two weeks to six months. Learning
was not formal --- no theories were taught nor practical
applications systematically demonstrated. Apprentice-
ship ceremonies could be quite formal but actual learning
was restrict to helping and observing the master at
work.
The following is a list of key personnels and their
40
skill level.
shirt industry
chief manufacturer
sewer manufacturer
plastic industry
chief manufacturer
material reprocessor
assembler
administrative
maintenance
quality control
inspector/
dispatcher
shop floor
cutter
sample sewer
sewer
assembler
ironer
packer
administrative
maintenance
quality control
inspector/
dispatcher
shop floor
sewer
assembler
ironer
administrative
maintenance
product design
designer/
operator
quality control
inspector/
dispatcher
technical staff
machine repair
shop floor
machine opera.
assembler
trimmer
packer
administrative
maintenance
shop floor
grinder/mixer
washer/sorter
administrative
maintenance
shop floor
paint./assem.
parts assem.
packer
mixed-:skill
mixed skill
high-skill
high-skill
high-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
med to low skill
mixed skill
mixed skill
high-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
mixed skill
mixed skill
high-skill
high-skill
high-skill
medium-skill
med.to low skill
low skill
low skill
mixed skill
mixed skill
medium skill
low skill
mixed skill
mixed skill
medium skill
med to low skill
low skill
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b. space, tool and machinery requirements of workers
Depending on the content of the job the piece-wage
worker would be required to provide space, tools and
machinery. This was because
(i) entrepreneurs were not able to provide the
capital,
(ii) entrepreneurs wished to minimize cash outlays,
and
(iii) physical and technological constraints such as
factory space av- ilable.
It was especially common for sewers to provide their
sewing machines and for plastic machine operators their
moulding machines. They also had to work in their
own homes.
3. quantities of labor
Their number varied from trade to trade (20%-80).
However fian to firm differences within the same sub-
manufacturer group were not significant.
Again there was' seasonal fluctuation. Such fluctua-
tion affected first the piece-wage laborers, then the
temporary employees and finally the permanent employees.
At times of economic recession the permanent employees
42
would be kept at reduced wages (underemployed). The
piece-wage level would not normally drop significantly
43
during bad times. Piece-wage work would simply dis-
appear.
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types of workers in different trades
shirt industry plastic industry
chief sewer chief material parts
manufac.. manufac. manufac. reprocs. assembl.
permanent 30% 20% 30% 80% 20%
temporary 40 40 50 20 50
piece-wage 30 40 20 0 30
100 100 100 100 100
skill mix of workers in different trades
high-skill 20% 10% 10% 20% 10%
medium-skill 60 .80 60 50 50
low-skill 20 10 30. 30 40
100 100 100 100 100
Most workers were employed as temporary and piece-
wage workers. Medium-skill and low-skill workers formed
the majority of the working force. Most medium-skill
workers were directly involved in production. It
must be recognized that administrative and maintenance
personnel had been included in the percentage distribu-
tion. They were either high-skill (administrators,
accountants etc.) or low-skill (maintenance cres,
cooks etc.).
D. generalizations of labor requirements
1. high temporary and piece-wage labor ratio
permanent labor
Because of high flexibility in production permanent
employment was offered to only a few indispensable skilled
workers (and some basic administrative and maintenance
staff). Much.of the productive force came from day-to-
day employees who worked on the factory premises and
piece-wage laborers who worked outside the factory.
The experience in Hong Kong in the early to mid 50's
helps to demonstrate the need for certain quality of
labor suuply to cope with the stresses and strains
normally associated with the birth of new industries. It
is doubtful that given the favorable market opportunities
the industries would have survived and grown if the
flexibility and quality of the labor supply were not
present.
2. medium skill requirement
Skill requirements for medium-skill workers which
formed the bulk of the productive force were not stringent.
Basic skills could normally be acquired through a short
period (2 weeks to 6 months) of apprenticeship (given
the demographic and personal characteristics).
3. production outside the factory space
Much of the work must be carried out outside the factory
premises. The workers would often be required to
contribute some tools or machinery for the work.
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E. relevance of classification of industrial type in labor terms
The labor requirements of the shirt and plastic industry
were similar to those of many other industries in the early to
mid 50's and also to some industries of later periods. The
45
following is a list of some of the more outstanding examples.
1. the fireworks industry since the early 50's
2. the rattan furniture industry in the early 50's
3. the knitting industry through out the 50's
4. some metal-ware industries manufacturing small size
articules throughout the 50's and 60's
5. the underwear garment industry in the late 50's
6. the wig industry in the mid 60's
They all demonstrate the same labor requirements as
describe in the earlier sections. A closer examination of
their history of development and the evolution of their produc-
tion processes will reveal parallel trends in market-orientations,
material supply pattern, labor requirements and micro-urban
locations.
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SECTION 3: LOGIC OF LOCATION
In this section factors which affect location decision will
be investigated individually.
The basic assumption is that given the production process
entrepreneurs operated to optimize the cost and production-and
revenue from sale. Since individual entrepreneurs were incapable
of providing their own favorable coditions for production they
would locate where such conditions were available at the lowest
cost. The following three aspects will therefore be investigated.
a. Locational variation in the vailability of factors.
This means locations with the presence of factors in
appropriate quantity and quality for the smooth function-
ing of the production process as perceived by entrepreneurs.
b. Variations in cost of or revenue from these factors at
locations where they were comparably available.
c. Substitutability of factors under critical situations.
The following location factors will be discussed.
a. market
b. input factors
i. raw material
ii. capital
iii. land
iv. transportation
v. labor46
c. external economies of scale and agglomeration
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A. market consideration,
Only external market and intermediate mprket would be con-
sidered. Internal markets were too small to have significant
47impacts.
1. external market
The price of products was the same for all locations of
production. Transportation between the place of manufacture
and the point of shipment would be legitimate concerns and
would be considered under the heading of transportation as
an input factor. It is sufficient to point out that intra-
urban distance was too small to make significant impact on
transport cost. Moreover transport cost was only marginal
to the total production cost.
2. intermediate market
These included used-material reprocessors, manufacturers
of parts etc. Their location must satisfy the needs of the
user industries. -They had to locate close to the user
industries (and supplier industries) such that small scale
transactions, and instant delivery which were vital to their
operations could be possible. Their logic of location fol-
lowed that of their users. Economies of agglomeration will
be discussed under the appropriate heading.
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B. raw material consideration
Hong Kong had few natural resources. Practically all
raw materials were imported. But certain processing might be
done in Hong Kong (e.g. cotton into threads then into cloths).
Material cost share in the production cost was about 40%
48
for the shirt industry and 60% for the plastic industry.
For large factories which brought directly from supplier-import-
ers or processors their major concern was to secure appropriate
quantity at the right time from sources outside Hong Kong.
49
No micro-locational consideration would be involved. Moreover
transport cost was only marginal to the cost of the materials.
For smaller factories which bought small quantities from
retailers locational relationship would sometimes be important.
50
On the other hand retailers located close to them to survive.
Their locational relationship could not be understood in terms
of transport cost which was marginal in any event. There was
an agglomeration effect at play, which will be discUssed under
the appropriate heading.
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C. capital consideration
511. cash outlay
These could be credits from banks, or money lenders or
from personal savings. Usually banks would accept the
Letter of Credential as "collateral evidence". Money
lenders would be approached only for occasional urgent
short-term needs. Such was not common practice. Many
refugee entrepreneurs had ready cash in the form of gold,
foreign currency or other valuables which they brought in
from China. Capital and entrepreneurship often came
together.
Hong Kong was a city-sate and the financial and banking
institutions operated evenly across the city. There was
no locational differential in interest rates or other credit
terms. However where money lenders were involved the
significance of ethnicity 2 personal relationship became
important. But there was no obvious locational perference
of either the money lender nor the manufacturer borrower.
However there was one possible situation of locational
discrimination. Creditors might decide to visit the
premises before the transaction. If the set-up of the
manufacturer was not found to be satisfactory the credit
might be stopped. This app;ied particularly to factories
53located in squatter areas where there were often no addresses.
In view of the lack of infrastructure in squatter areas
54industrial types were very limited. These were small scale
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operators who would not normally deal with banks or other
institutions directly (and by the same reason they were
primarily sub-manufacturers who had no direct access to
buyers or exporters). They would approach money lenders
who would be prepared to overlook their lack of credential
for a higher interest rate.5  These cases were not common.
Besides, such variations in credit availability and terms
were not primarily a locational consideration but rather
the overall credit qualification of the borrower. In
other words entrepreneurs with similar credit qualifications
but with different factory location would have the same
credit difficulty.
2. credit on materials
In the early 50's materials (plastic grains, cloth etc.)
could be obtained on credit for 60 days with final account
to be settled at the end of the year (lunar year). Credit
from material suppliers or intermediate producers depended
56
heavily on personal relationships. Similar "locational"
discrimination as in the case of cash credit was applicable
to material credit, though with much greater leniency.
In effect there was hardly any locational variance in
credit on-materials.
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D. land consideration
There were two major considerations --- space and rent.
They were interdependent.
1. availability of appropriate space, facilities and
infrastructure
Factory floor space requirement varied from a few
hundred square feet to a few thousand souare feet. Spatial
requirement was not an absolute standard determined by tech-
nology. In fact modern technology required much more
57
space, while the technologies actually adopted demanded
very little space in comparison.
Capital outlay was deliberately kept to a minimum to
allow easy entrance into and exit from the industries.
Constructing one's own factory space with the proper facili-
ties and infrastructure would be very expensive and beyond
the means of most entrepreneurs. The first alternative
was to convert existing residential space into factories.
There were few legal complications. Most of the earlier
leases for residential buildings did not restrict industrial
usage. Besides the government bureaucracy was too busy
with other problems brought by the sudden population expan-
sion to intervene effectively into the industrial use of
residential buildings, even if it wanted to do so Another
option was to operate in "illegal" squatter areas. Here
the entrepreneur encountered practically no legal opposition
at all. The problem with operating in squatter areas was
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the lack of proper facilities --- water, electricity, and
infrastructure (roads, sewers etc.). Heavy rains, typhoons
and the risk of fire made squatter areas much less attractive.
Except for very small factories where water and electricity
were not required in the production process, squatter sites
59
were not favored.
A typical tenament floor was 600 sq.ft. and an apartment
flat would be about the same area. These could be adapted
easily to become factories. Such buulding types could be
found trhoughout the urban centres especially in the older
60
built-up areas.
However with the influx of refugees between 1945-1949
61
urban areas were already overcrowded. Factory space which
reqapired the whole floor or greater part of a floor would
be difficult to find in the older urban residential districts.
The pattern of urbanization was such that the areas of least
62
resistance to factory location were the newer urban areas
developed after 1945. The new structures were of reinforced
concrete construction. These were more suitable to factory
use than the timber structure (floor only) in older urban
areas, in terms of floor loading, noise level and fire risk.
63
Infrastructure in newer areas was better and less overloaded.
Moreover the older urban areas were already extremely over-
crowded, making acquisition of whole floors (600 to 1,000
sq.ft.) for factory use quite impossible. Squatter areas
lacked basic facilities and infrastructure for proper
factory use. Entrepreneurs would consider the newer urban
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areas developed after 1945 their first choice. (see map)
The invasion of:factory space in residential districts
began with the occupation of the ground floor. Mixed
commercial-residential land-use hpd existed for a long time
in Hong Kong. Few buildings in urban centres were strictly
residential. Since the early 30's ground floors of tena-
ment buildings in urban centres had been used for retail
commerce. The residential portion occupied the upper
floors. In the older districts some commercial use gave
way to factory use. This was not a uniform process. But
by and large commercial character for the district was re-
tained. In the newer districts where commercial potential
was not yet obvious industries moved in. As a result
industrial-residential land-use became to characterize the
newer districts.
Later when commercial potential became apparent in the
newer districts commercial use competed with factory use
for the ground floors. Since industries did not require
direct horizontal access to streets as did commercial retail
they began to move up the floors to exploit the cheaper
64
rent. Districts became commercial-industrial-residential.
With the exception of a few large entrepreises which operated
in "single-purpose" factory buildings most of the medium to
65
small factories operated in this fashion during the mid 50's.
66
2. cost of factory space
During this stage of industrial take-off industrial
demand for land was still low compared with residential
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demand. Suitable land for construction was still availa-
ble. Locational fluctuation in the cost of factory
space was more the result of the pattern of urbanization
than that of the absolute demand for industrial space.
Factory space was nearly always rented on a month-to-
month basis. Uni-functional factory buildings were not
available. Tenaments and-apartments were rented floor by
floor.
Price of space(for factory use or otherwise) in the newer
67
urban areas varied between two extremes. There were the
68
high class residential developments with space standards
too large (thousands of sq.ft.) and too expensive for indus-
trial use, even thwn there was no objection from "influen-
tial" residents of the area or from the government. Factory
spaces in other newer urban areas developed for medium to
low income residential consumption did not have wide loca-
tional fluctUation in prices. But this was true only in
the early to mid 50's when the cost of land at the urban
fringe where these developments were, was still low compared
69
with the cost of construction. Generally price fell as
locations were farther away from existing urban centres.
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E. transportation consideration
There are two types of transportation.
1. raw materials and finished products
2. personnel
There are two issues in transportation.
a. availability of transportation (networks, vehicles etc.)
b. cost
1. materials and products
a. availability of transportation
Raw materials and products were normally transported
by trucks unless the quantity was very small, in which
case taxis, b.cycles, carts or carriers might be used;
or the distance was very close, in which case bicycles,
carts or carriers would be used. All these different
modes of transportation wculd be possible in the urban
areas where there were motor roads.
In the early 50's motor roads had already over the
whole metropolitan area. (see map) In the squatter
areas carts, bicycles and carriers would have to be
used because roads were too narrow and sometimes too
steep for cars. In many instances goods were transported
over the squatter areas on foot, bicycles or carts and
were transferred at the edge of the squatter areas onto
motor vehicles. The same road condition existed in the
New Territories, except that the situation was aggrevated
-87-
many times even when factories were located very close
to main roads. No entrepreneurs would think of locating
in the New Territories for this very reason.
As far as the transportation of materials and goods
was concerned entrepreneurs wished to locate where there
were motor roads. In Hong Kong this meant all urban
areas with the exception of squatter areas.
b. cost
In the transportation of goods the delivery cost
would include loading and unloading at either end and
transportation in between destinations. Loading and
70
unloading costs did not vary among urban locations.
The urban areas on either side of the harbor never ex-
tended more than a couple of miles from the shore-line.
The largest single distance between the farthest corner
in the metropolitan area did not exceed 5 miles. Trans-
port- bost between destinations (e.g. factory to dockyard,
factory to warehouses, factory to factory) .could always
be covered in two hours even through the occasional
traffic jams. Transport cost was, however, marginal
to the total production cost.
Transportation by carts, bicycles, carriers would
cost more considering the cost per unit weight trans-
ported. But the objection to such modes of transport-
ation did not arise from their relative costs, which were
still very low when compared to the production cost.
71
They were objected to for reasons of inconveniences and
tim\when they had to be used.
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2. personnel ,
a. availability of transportation
Public transportation served primarily the urban
areas.. Service was dependable but the number of
72
routes were very limited.
Service of public transportation to urban fringes
was also drastically reduced. There were bus or
tram routes to all major squatter concentrations at
the urban fringe, but these routes were scheduled at
long time intervals. The bus or tram terminals were
often as far as J hour walk from the major residential
concentration (e.g. Chai Wan, Jordan Valley) making
public transportation an extremely tedious and .time
consuming mode of travel.
b. cost
Fares for public transportation was not exceedingly
73
high but could be too high for some low wage workers.
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F. labor consideration
Entrepreneurs wished to locate where labor with the
qualities described in section 2 would be available in sufficient
quantities (measured by the inverse of the difficulty of recruit-
ment) and at acceptable cost. Location inplications of
dinsinfa in labor requirements are discussed here.
1. availability
a. High temporary and piece-wage labor ratio
permanent labor
This required that temporary and piece-wage workers
would be recruited easily.
Unemployment among refugees was much higher than
74
among the local population. They would accept any
work available to them. This description was applicable
initially to the unemployed male heads of households.
But housewives and children in the refugee areas, where
unemployment was high would also take up any temporary
or piece-wage work available to them. Most of the
refugee children were not attending schoo lecause
there were not enough schools for these new comers.
And if children had no school housewives had to stay at
home to look after them. This made piece-wage "put-
out" work even more attractive to housewives. Also
they had more economic need for temporary and piece-
wage employment because of the high proportion of male
heads of household created employable housewives and
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children. Location mobility for these housewives and
children was very low (especially when they had to work
at home). There was a general tendency for factories
demanding this quality of labor to be located near
these sources.
b. skill-requirements
There was a mismatch of skill between many unemployed
males and the skill requirements of available jobs.
Sewing (not tailoring) was not a "traditional" occupation
for males.. Girls were taught sewing since they were
young.. Although the acauisition of sewing skill was
not a very difficult task entrepreneurs would rather
turn to the readily available sources---housewives, and
young girls---than to wait for male workers to catch up.
Moreover males were not eager to acquire the skill
because sewing was not perceived as the only job
opportunity. As the jobs in other industries became
available to the unemployed male workers piece-wage
sewing became practically an all.woman occupation.
Much the same story can be said of plastic trimming
and assembly work and some plastic reprocessingalthough
children were employed in equally large numbers in
these trades..
Their locational mobility was generally low (given
the shape of public transportation and the fzct that
they had to carry bulky materials and products back
and forth between factory and home). Factories had
to locate very close to employ this labor.
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Location consideration for permament and skilled
workers was less important. Permament and skilled
employment were largely dominated by male workers.
Their number fluctuated only slightly with macro-
economic condition (except in the case.of drastic
changes). Their location mobility was much higher
than that of housewives and children and they often
resided in factory premises. Their small number
also helped to make location consideration on their
behalf less important..
c, significant production outside the factory premise
This meant that space and capital (in the form of
tools and machinery) had to be provided by the workers.
There was no location variation in the ability of
workers to provide tools and machinery. Space provision
(for plastic reprocessing, moulding and shirt sewing
sometimes) was a more serious problem.
The older built up areas were already extremely
overcrowded. A dozen households would occupy one
tenament floor. Entire families often lived in bed
spaces, cubicles and cocklofts of less than 50 sq.ft.
each (a standard double bed is 24 sq.ft.). It would be
quite impossible (in terms of space) to operate machinery
inside the building. Even the streets were occupied
by street squatters. Another consideration was the
construction of the buildings. These were multi-
story structures with timber floors. Heavy and
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noisy and vibrating machinery (sewing) or harzardous
and fire-risky operations (plastic moulding) would not
be tolerated by other residents.
76
Squatter areas were much more spacious. But squatter
areas had no infrastructure and road access.
Operations requiring electricity and water (e.g. plastic
moulding and cloth dyeing) would not be possible.
But such operations were found at edges of squatter
areas abutting urban area. Operations such as sewing,
plastic assembling, material reprocessing could be
accommodated.
Newer urban settlement with reinforced concrete
structures could accommodate noisy and fire-risky
operations. Public facilities and infrastructure
were also available. Spatial standards were higher
77
than those of olderer areas but were not quite enough
for the more spacious operations (e.g. plastic
reprocessing). -
To conclude, labor considerations favored location
with high concentration of (a) male workers with occupa-
tional skills, (b) ready-to-hire semi-skilled to low-
skilled workers (housewives and children). Space for
for production outside the factory would be required.
The newer(post-war) built-up areas and squatter areas
with high refugee concentration would seem to be
favorable locations.
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There were physical limitations as to how far the
factories could be located from their pirece-wage labor
source. Materials would have to be collected from the
factories and finished delivered to the factories.
These were often bulky (plastic parts and heavy (cloths).
Public transportation was not suitable even when
78
available and fares were high compared with waged.
Housewives with small children could not get away from
the house too long. Since housewives usually shopped
twice a day for food they would prefer to combine the
pick-up and delivery with their shopping trips. This
would limit the radius they could walk and the weight
they could carry. Pick-up and delivery by the factories
were not feasible even when entrepreneurs could invest on
transport vehicles. Roads were had in squatter areas,
products had to be inspected and instructions had to be
given verbally. All these required the workers to
come to the factory themselves. Usually workers would
not walk for more than an hour on a return trip.(shopping
included3 ? This would mean less than half a mile.
2. cost of labor
There was no location variation in wage scale of workers
(for all three types). Difference in the wage scale and
fringe benefits for permanent workers were results of
individual negotiations. Piece-wages were equal for
similar products. Sometimes in order to fulfil a sudden
order entrepreneurs would raise the pirece-wage. But such
had nothing to do with location decision of factories.
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G. external economies consideration
1. economies of scale
The types of industries and their production processes
as described earlier did not require high fixed cost in
production. The major cost was in material and labor
which fluctuated directly with scale of production.
Economies of scale were not an relevant consideration.
2. agglomeration effect
Agglomeration effect must be understood within the
framework of process co-ordination. Certain support
support industry prototypes capable of adapting to shirt
and plastic manufacture existed before 1949 to (a) support
entrepot trade activities e.g. printing, packaging, metal
works etc., or (b) serve local consumers e.g. machine
repairs, metal works, cloth processing etc. These
industries were small operations and were dispersed
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in the newer urban areas. The first shirt and plastic
factories did not locate in these industrial-commercial-
residential areas for phe purpose of taking advantage 8 1
of the possible external economies provided by these
supporting industries. They located there because
appropriate factories space at suitable price was
available at these locations.-
However, once they were located in these areas they
they reinforced the locational viability of the supporting
industries. Production process links began to be esta-
blished. Other supporting industries were created
(e.g. material supply and processing such as dyeing,
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shrinking, printing, button-and-holeslabel makers etc.
for the shirt industry; material suppliers of various
types, tdould makers, machine fabrication and repairs etc.
for plastic industry). Certain firms in the supporting
industries were made better equipped (technologically and
experience-wise) than others to service the shirt and
plastic manufacturing industries. These then became
external economies consideration for other manufacturers.
The growth between the manufacturing industries and their
supporting industries was therefore symbiotic.
Agglomeration effects were vital to the small manu-
facturers who did not have sufficient storage and produc-
tion space, and who could not keep skilled maintenance
personnel and maintain adequate raw material stock.
They required small quantities of materials to be
instantly obtainable from retailers or material processors,
or "borrowable" from fellow manufacturers to keep pro-
duction process from slacking at crucial moments.
They needed instant repairs to the few machines -they
had. Their products had to be shipped away as soon as
they were produced to relieve space for further production.
Intermediate producers also depended on agglomeration of
industries to make personnel contacts to users of their
products, to solicit business and to design product speci-
fications. They also needed instant access to raw materials
and product delivery. Such agglomerations were therefore
small and compact---usually within 15 minutes walking
distance fi mile).
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H. conclusion
1. Flexibility in production was the basic requirement for
survival in the early 50's. Most factories were small.
Capital investment was kept to the minimum because of
unpredictable market future. Labor was found to be the
most manipulable factor to achieve production flexibility.
Labor was required to buffer the entrepreneura against the
fluctuating production level and to contribute space and
capital for production. However the mobility of this
type of labor required by the production process was ex-
tremely restricted. This limited the location options
of factories to the large concentrations of urban unemployed.
2..Land consideration was only secondary because spatial and
infrastructure requirement were flexible. Lack of urban-
ization policy had allowed land option to be extended to
include practically all urban areas.
3. Agglomeration effects were important factor because of the
scale and mode of production.
4. Transport cost in an intra-urban context was not an im-
portant consideration because of short distances and few
breaking points. Moreover transport cost was not signi-
ficant in the total 'production cost. .Transportation avai-
libility was a more important consideration in terms of
mobility because of uneven development in transportation
network and public transportation services.
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SECTION4: EPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
We have identified 4 major factors --- land, transportation,
labor and agglomeration, which varied locationally in terms of
their availability and cost. We have also identified the sets
of locations where each of these factors was in its favorable
conditions.
In this section these factors will be considered simul-
taneously with the one another. The following locations will
be identified.
1. locations with favorable land, transportation, agglo-
meration and labor.
2. locations with unfavorable labor
3. locations with unfavorable transportation
4. locations with unfavorable land
5. locations with unfavorable agglomeration effect
6. locations with every factor unfavorable except labor
These sets of location conditions will be compared with
the locations of the industries to test empirically if labor
concern was the fundamental consideration in location.
A positive correlation of location set I with the pattern
of industrial location is expected, since location set I
represented the "best" possible combination of location factors.
A negative correlation of location set 2 is necessary to
establish the indispensability of the labor factor as well as
its non-substitutability.
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Positive correlations of location sets 3,4 and 5 will
reinforce the indispensability of the labor factor over the
other factors. Their negative correlations will indicate
that certain other factors are as indispensable as the labor
factor.
A positive correlation of location set 6 will demonstrate
the sufficiency of the labor factor in industrial location
consideration. This will be the strongest indication of the
importance of the labor factor.
The following observations are made.
1. The majority of factories located in the new urban
areas and at the urban fringes. This pattern coin-
cided with the location of labor concentration (high
unemployment) and cheap land. But transportation
in these places were usually less efficient (but
acceptable), especially for personnel. Agglomeration
of supporting industries were not present in these
newer areas. On the other hand many factories were
found in the older urban areas where conditions for
labor, transportation and agglomeration were usually
favorable but factory space was much less suitable and
expensive.
2. Factories were found to concentrate at locations where
all the factors were in favorable conditions. In fact
these areas --- Shum Shiu Po, Tai Kok Tsui and San Po
Kong --- were the first industrial expansion areas after
1949.
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3. No factories were found at locations where conditions
of all factors except labor were fpvorable. Any area
more than j mile from concentrations of potential labor
supply (squatters and refugee concentrations) was
considered to have unfavorable labor condition.
4. Factories were found in areas with unfavorable trans-
portation condition. These were small areas of
squatters (e.g. Shek Kip Mei and San Po Kong) or tem-
porary "resettlement" areas at the urban fringe (e.g.
Ngau Tau Kok and Shau Kei Wan).
5. Factories were found in areas with unfavorable land
condition. These were areas of higher rent or un-
suitable space as in the case of older urban districts
(e.g. Shum Shui Po, Kowloon City and the Western Dis-
trict). There were also new urban areas with higher
rent (e.g. North Point). Industries were also present
in squatter areas where infrastructure and amenity
conditions were unfavorable.
6. Factories were found in areas with unfavorable agglo-
meration effects. These were the newer urban areas
which extended from the old urban areas instead of
growing out independently (e.g. Cheung Sha Wan, Ngau
Tau Kok, North Point and Shau Kei Wan. They were
usually close to large concentrations of refugees.
It is interesting to note that these industrial areas
developed at a second stage after those with all
favorable conditions (as in 2).
PATTERN OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATIONS IN THE EARLY TO MID 50's
0
i Wan
lCat! 1 1NCm!s To 0Of Mit-
...... .......... O..,
Are 34.== On fue Poem
LOCATION SET.WITH ALL CONSIDERATIONS FAVORABLE
NEW T RITORIES
DIAMOND HILL NGAU CHO WAN
50 UKWOG AI
LAI CHI KOKN
CNEUNG S Sa Po K PORN
KOWLOON TONG
\OWL
O17 JORDAN VALLEY
Shum Shiu-
INDUTRIAKOWLOON 
A
These wee areasof firs
STONECUTTERS ISLAND A TAU KOK
NO MAN TIN N . WUN TONG
VAU MA It
PARK
INDUSTRIAL LOCA TION HN O
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
W ITH ALL CONSI- TAU TONG
- DER ATIONS*FAVORABLE
* TS SMA I I
PIAK 0
These were.areas of first 'b-
i..ndustria~l development
- NWORTN t0oN?
04*1EN ISLAND fSTIRN O
- AUSEWAY-
EDSAI VMSG PU INTAA QU1AY2A
-- WANCM4AI
V Kitt WAN
MOUNT DAVIS
- * HAPPY%
VAL -
StAtt 7 INCHrs TO ONE 11t1.-
Apprelmate Baendade*s O
Ar* 3kee On T14.0 Pia.
LOCATION SET WITH UNFAVORABLE LABOR CONDITION ONLY
40
\Z2le.C.
Ig 06 #to# 1
a 4.4 a IP AREA WITH UNFAVORABLE
LABOR BUT FAVORABL:
TAND TPANSP ANTD
AGGLOMERATION '6 -A T Pf
The area had residential buildinA, Y
with cheap rent ready for indust ral
use. It was a new urban area devi
oped around a dockyard. and ce:Aent
factory and' cl s f supporting o-
industries e e by the
Tra a
s d prsonn tho
ublic rnsportat' n f k
~nios convenie
B t as away o a or co ce -
tra' f refugees -a sonlat s
ft..*d~*~ O~p
SCtSNC4A 10 OJ? Its.
I
0-
LOCATION SET WITH UNFAVORABLE TRANSPORTATION
NEW T RITORIES
DIAMOND "ILL NGAU CHI WAN
so UK WONG TA TSN
LAI CHI KOKN
CHEUG 5SMIEK KIP Mil
KOWLOON TONG \ PO O
. squa ter
L 'Ah 11v3JODAN VALtEY
MON(, OKKowtON RAY
STONECUTTIERS ISLAND M TAU KOK
HO N N uatter
KWUN TONG
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION KINGS
AREA WITH UNFAVORABLE
TRANSPORTA TION
These were squatter areas with
no motor roads. Industrial
-types were restricted to non-
powered,- non-water operations
with some exceptions at the
suatter-urban a ea dges).s*
GAIN MtAND.
AUSEWAY
$ATA
9oy 40 LT N Oy
-
- - N WAN
VALLI s qubt ter
ScAtS I Nmcl~s 'T OftyIt 1
A",e.l.a.e Jk&m.*s,&&s 0.19
A,* She- 0- Two Poo-,
LOCATION SET WITH UNFAVORABLE LAND
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
W2__AREA WITH UNFAVORABLE
LAND
Th higher rent areas were older
urban areas2 Areas with unsuit.
able space. were -locations with
old timber structures or over-
crowded tenament buildings where
industrial operation would be
-hazardous Pable.
0GRIEN ISLAND 5SER" 0
uitabL'e S c
tter c e the eces-
ra tru6 re a d me' ie
bu e more g s,apa ter
SCt 7ICM4!$ TO ONF -'"
IA,* S%.. 0. Ma.
LOCATION SET WITH UNFAVORABLE AGGLOMERATION EFFECT
0
AREA WITH UNFAVORABLE
AGGLOMERATION EFFEC
These were newer areas develope
after 1949 and were at least
mile from existing industrial
clusters.
O REM""
R 6\RM
SCMf 7 114CWf% TO 0-41 "ftf
LOCATION SET WITH ALL CONSIDERATIONS UNFAVORABLE EXCEPT LABOR
\INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
AREA WITH ALL FACTORS
UNFAVORABLE EXCEPT
LA BOR
These were souatter areas at the:-
urban fringe where all conditions
were unfavorable.
0GRIN ISLAND
DoV
ScA I I INCA S TO ONE Mit Aal. ~ a-
-110-
SECTION CONCLUSION,
The shirt and plastic industry in Hong Kong in the early
to mid 50's were "labor-intensive" industries. In order to
gain a foothold on the export market and in order to be com-
petitive with other producing countries the production opera-
tion must be very flexible. The production process must be
tailored to satisfy the fluctuating demands from foreign buyers.
Labor input had to be flexible. The temporary worker to
permanent worker ratio was high, skill requirement was moderate
and production outside the factory premises was necessary.
The demographic and urbanization pattern had formed
concentrations of unemployed semi-skilled to low-skilled i
refugees. These workers were prepared to work in any situation.
But cultural and social norms and physical limitation had res-
tricted the locational mobility of a large segment of this
labor force (housewives and children). In order to tap this
labor resource industries had to overcome the relative immo-
bility of the labor force by locating close to it.
The following conclusions are drawn from the analysis of
the logic of location and confirmed by empirical observations
of the actual locations of the industries.
1. There was a strong tendency for the shirt and plastic
industries of the early to mid 50's in Hong Kong to
locate in areas where there were favorable labor con-
ditions (large concentrations of refugees). This
was true even when other input concerns were less
-III-
favorable. Their location affinity to labor can be
explained by their peculiar labor requirements demanded
by their mode of production.
2. The fact that unfavorable conditions of all other
location factors (land, transportation and agglomera-
tion) were tolerated (observations 4,5 and 6) and that
no factory was found to locate in areas with unfavorable
labor condition (observation3) indicates that the labor
consideration was more important than the other factors.
3. This above conclusion, when taken together with the
observation 7 that industries located in areas where no
factor was in satisfactory condition except that of
labor will indicate that labor was not only the necessary
condition for the operation of the industries but that
under certain circumstancmesLit might be the sufficient
condition.
4. The rate at which the industries grew helped to accen-
tuate the problem of location because areas with
favorable conditions were quickly taken up leaving the
late comers to the next best choices. Trade-offs
among the various factors became necessary. The first
expansion of the industries was located in areas where
all conditions were favorable (observation 2). After
these areas were taken up further expansion had to
locate at less than optimum areas. The logic of location
ther became apparent.
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5. The logic of location is not affected by the fact that
the manufacturing industries were export-oriented.
Market orientation in traditional location theories is
considered in terms of the delivery cost of the product
(transport cost plus transfer cost). In a micro-urban
context such consideration are no longer important.
Transport cost does not vary significantly among micro-
urban locations, whether the market is external or
internal. Moreover, in secondary manufacturing indus-
tries discussed in this research transport cost is
likely to be only marginal to the total production
cost. However it must be noted that perishability,
weight and buld and marketing ppttern will sometimes
require manufacturing location and shipment or retail
location to be close to each other even in micro-urban
context.
6. The fact that there was no locational variation in the
availability and cost of raw materials does not weaken
the logic of the location decision. It rather demon-
strates that traditional location theories designed to
explain locations of "heavy" industries with strong
emphasis on transportation are not very -useful in a
micro-urban context and with regard to manufacturing
industries where transport cost is only marginal to
the cost of the raw materials.
7. The locational consideration of capital is also not
relevant in a situation where credit terms and government
-113-
tax and subsidy structure do not vary in a micro-urban
scale. However these conditions are not always true.
Financial institutions and government bureaucracy do
sometimes have locational preferences or discrimina-
tions even within a micro-urban context.
-114-
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This Chapter will, examine the shirt and plastic industry
in the late 60's in Hong Kong.
Section 1: background
This section deals with the changed physical, social
and economic background with special emphasis on the
pattern of urbanization, changes in the demographic
and personal characteristic of population and the
trend of industrial development.
Section 2: the industries
This section looks at the growth of the two industries
with emphasis on the stability and predictability of
the export mnrket, systemization and mechanization of
the production process and diversification within the
industries. Their implications on labor requirements
are examined.
Section 3: logic of location
This section investigates the logic of location in
the changed physical, socio-economic environment, still
adopting the perspective of the entrepreneur.
Section 4: empirical observations
This section looks at the pattern of location com-
petition (not the existing pattern of factory location
as in the previous Chapter) to identify the critical
location factors.
Section 5: conclusion
This section draws conclusion on the relevance of the
labor factor in this new physical-socio-economic
environment.
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND
A. the place
By the late 60's the urban area in Hong Kong had expanded
to 30 sq. miles as compared to 13 sq. miles in-the early 50's.
Fringe areas in the early 50's became centres as the urban
area sprawled along arterial roads and as new towns came into
being. The system of roads, drainage, water supply and
electricity supply had been expanded dramatically. The
total lengths of roads may not have increased much but the
width, surface, drainage etc. of road and other infrastructure
had been improved significantly. In fact practically b of
the total road surface had been reconstructed and improved.
In the early 50's only the northern side of Hong Kong
island was densely populated. By late 60's the urban area
had expanded around the island and industrial and residential
clusters sprang up along the arterial ring road around the
island.
The expansion of the urban area in Kowloon and New
Kowloon was even more dramatic. Urban built-up areas at
least doubled. Expansion ran along the coast line to the
borth and east. Most of the public housing construction and
industrial development was in New Kowloon. The new industrial
town of Kwun Tong was completed by 1969.
Growth was equally spectacular in the New Territories.
Self-sufficient new towns were built (Tsuen Wan accommodating
about 600,000) or planned (Castle Peak for 1 million and
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Shatin for j million). These new.towns were lprgely resi-
dential-industrial settlement with more than j of the total
housing stock public housing for low-income population.
B. the people
The total population had grown to nearly 4 million by
1968. The influx of refugees had stopped after 1954 except
for a brief spell in 1958. Much of the growth had been
natural growth.
?
There was a marked difference in the age and sex ratio'
between the population of the early 50's and that of the late
60's. The population was much younger and there was a higher
percentage of young working females. The children born after
1949 became young men and women. There was a significant
3
improvement in the general level of education. Working
children under 14 hpd practically disappeared because of
child-labor laws and "compulsory" primary school education.
But many children entered the labor force at the age of 14
after their primary school education. There were more girls
than boys in this category because there was a traditional
bias against girls for higher education. But the share of
male workers eas much higher in the category above 18 years
because there was a high ratio of male entry and a high ratio
of housewives withdrawal from the labor force.
Economic conditions of families improved significantly
because the general economic situation of Hong Kong had
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improved significantly because the general economic situation
of Hong Kong had improved and because many children worked.
to support the family. Housewives would not have to work as
in the earlier period. Occupation mobility had improved
because of improved education.
Since the resettlement program began in 1954 1/3 of the
total population had moved into accommodations provided by
4
government or government-aided agencies by 1968. Private
residential development was also substantial. Overcrowding
in urban areas was still the major problem. There were
still about 402,000 squatters in 1968, most of whom in the
Kowloon and New Kowloon area.
6
C. industrial development
By the late 60's Hong Kong had firmly established markets
for different kinds of exports. Its earlier buyers were
mainly the United Kingdom and the Southeast Asian countries,
but by the late 60's markets in the U.S., Australia and
Europe had been opened up. The major problem facing the
entrepreneurs was restrictions imposed by foreign government
--- through tariff, quota or voluntary restriction. To deal
with this the government and the industrialists took active
measure collectively to negotiate with foreign governments,
to promote the manufactured goods of Hong Kong and to open up
new markets.
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Over the decade from 1959 to 1969 exports of domestic
manufactures increased five-fold from HK$2,282 million to
HK$10,518 constituting 80% of the total exports in the latter
year. Industrial employment rose from 177,000 in 1959 to
528,000 in 1969 These were figures from registered or
recorded establishments. The total would be close to double
8
the figure. The share of the shirt and plastic industry in
this growth was most significant. The clothing industry was
ranked the highest in the export share and the plastic industry
the third.
Workers unions were weak in spite of the dramatic growth
of the industries. They were political organizations with
affiliations to either the Chinese Nationalist or the Communist
cause. Membership was not extensive or compulsory. Collec-
tive bargaining for wages and working conditions were not the
major objectives of union activities.
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SECTION 2: THE INDUSTRIES
A. the industries
The export market had now been well established for both
industries. The internal market was also growing. Clothing9
(in general) production and exports had increased both absolutely
and relatively. Comprising 34.8% of all domestic exports in
10 11
1959, they rose to 36.4% of a much larger total in 1969.
Plastic toys and dolls etc. rose to the third 1 rgest export
following the declining textile yarns, fabrics and made-up
articles. They made up 8.1% of the total. Plastic flowers
was 3.5% and occupied the 5th place in export performance.
The important export market consideration for these indus-
tries (as opposed to say electronics and tourism) was foreign
12
restriction. Entrepreneurs united to deal with foreign market
13problems collectively and with help from the government.
Most factories dealt directly with foreign buyers instead
of through exporters. Seasonal fluctuations were more pre-
dictable. Factories could deep up a higher basic level of
production even in the usually lean months because the volume
of orders could be estimated more reliably in an established
market. But there were smaller factories operating on the
periphery doing surplus work for the lprger ones. For these
the requirement for flexibility was still a major consideration.
There were also smaller factories catering for specific markets
(internal or industrial-user market) or manufacturing special
products (shirt collar stiffeners, simple utensils, beads etc).
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1. the shirt industry
For the shirt industry the products were still for
the middle to low price market (both external and in-
ternal). The products had not changed significantly
(although the raw materials had1 but the production
process had changed to increase the speed and volume
of production. The manufacturing process was more
elaborate and complicated. There was significant
mechanization and systemization. Factories were much
more heavily capitalized. The size of factories had
generally increased. The typical firm had about 200
powered sewing machines compared with majority-of the
early 50's having less than 50 manual machines.
Practically all operations would be carried out in the
factory premises which ranged from 3,000 sq. ft. to well
over 10,000 sq.ft. Much of the operation was standardized
and reouired no craftsmanship (except for the designers
and cutters).
Put-out work was reduced to a minimum. For smaller
factories which required some putting-out work agents
would often be used to contract out the work. These
.agents would deliver the materials and finished shirts.
Very few individual workers would be required to come to
the factories for put-out work. The agents had replaced
the sewer-manufacturers of the early 50's.
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2. the plastic industry
For the plastic industry the diversification in pro-
ducts and production processes was more significant than
that of the shirt industry. High quality products of
larger size and/or elaborate design were produced for the
U.S. and European markets. Smaller or simpler products
were made for markets in South-East Asia and East Africa.
The internal market also demanded different oualities and
types of products. Factories of different sizes and pro-
duction processes were foundg5  There were factories em-
ploying less than 20 operators and using manually operated
moulding machines. There were also the highly automated
factories with sophisticated machines and employing over
500 workers. For the larger factories much of the opera-
tions were carried out in the factory premises. Hgwever
much of the assembly work (if assembly was required) was
put-out. Again agents were gradually replacing the earlier
practice of individual workers coming to the factory to
collect work. But the agent method was not as passive as
in the shirt industry.
The chief employer in the industry was the plastic
moulding manufacturer. Plastic raw material reprocessing
was being phased out because there was a general decline in
the international price of new raw materials.
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B. the production process
Unlike their predecessors in the early 50's operating
on the margin of the economy the shirt and plastic industries
had become the pillars of the economy. Their combined share
in the gross national product and in employment was more than
16
any other industry.
Export markets had been established. Volume of exports
had increased dramatically and renuirement for flexibility had
been considerably reduced. The internal market was more pre-
dictable and production levels could be adjusted without drastic
fluctuations. Factories had grown large in size and number.
The seemingly unlimited supply labor in the early 50's
became dried up with the process of industrialization. By
mid-60's the unemployment figure was reduced to 1.2%. Practically
anyone who wanted a job could find one 7 New comers into the
labor market were also different from their predecessors. These
were young people with more formal education and less family
responsibility (unmarried singles living with parents or young
married couple with no children). They could afford to be more
selective in jobs than could their parents.
18
.On the other hand capital availability and technological
advances' ad made substitution for labor possible. Whether
such substitution would be profitable depended on the nature of
the market and thb mode of operation of each entrepreneur.
For the larger and more established factories the primary
consideration in the design of production process was efficiency
-c12 24.
in production and management using mechanized and systemized
methods. For the smaller ones flexibility of production and
mimization of sunk-in capital investment were still the major
concern.
1. flexibility of production
Most manufacturers could deal directly with foreign
buyers and higher predictability and control over the
volume of production could be achieved. Hong Kong
products were mainly for the middle and low price
market externally or internally. This meant that
demands were more stable over the short run. Although
some seasonal fluctuations were-,always present their
impact could be minimized.
The major market problems for the export manufacturer
was foreign protectionism. But these were survival
issues for the whole industry and not flexibility issues
for the individual entrepreneurs.
For smaller factories on the periphery of the market
and for factories producing from intermediate industrial-
users flexibility of production was still a major issue.
The sole reason for their survival was precisely their
ability to.act as buffer for the larger factories in
case of fluctuation not anticipated.
2. division of labor and standardization
The process of standardization and division of labor
was more complete in larger factories and in the shirt
manufacturing industry.
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For the shirt industry almost all operations (from
designing to packaging) were carried out in the premises.
No one single operator would do all the sewing. For
the more systemized factories the manufacturing process
would be divided into 24 stages (from preparation of
cloths for cutting to label sticking). Moving assembly
line technique was adopted. Powered sewing machines
and special job machines (buttoning rimming and pressure
etc.) were used. Operations were standardized and
craftsmanship requirement reduced.
For the plastic industry the larger factories were
automated and jobs were clearly defined and standardized.
The smaller factories still followed similar process to
those of their predecessors in the early 50's except
that powered machines were used instead. Much of the
assembly and trimming work was still put-out for the
small as well as the lnrge factories.
3. quality control
Because of the increased division of labor and stand-
ardization for most factories there was more need for
systematic supervision and standardized training.
Individual craftsmanship was not an important considera-
tion except for the highly specialized key personnel
(cutter, sample-sewer or mould-maker). The ordinary
workers would only be reouired to perform simple
operations e.g. in the shirt industry: button-hole
opener, sleevesewer, sleeve and trunk joiner, label
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sticker etc. ; and in the plastic industry: mould
setter, temperature checker etc. Many factories had
short training courses for basic operator training,
that lasted 2 to 6 weeks. Supervision was an important
tool used by almost all factories to ensure the quality
of production. There was a growing middle-level
management personnel (dispatcher, foreman, team leader
etc.) not present in the earlier period.
4. process-coordinator
a. internal coordination at each entrepreneur
Internal process coordination became a very important
consideration in systemization. Functions performed
by individual workers were simple and standardized but
pre-planning, scheduling, monitoring and feedback became
the major task to ensure smooth production. There was
a hierachy of managers, sub-managers, workshop co-
ordinators, inspectors etc. who maintained the smooth
functioning of the production system.
b. external coordination among entrepreneurs
External process coordination declined in importance
as more operation were carried out inside the. However
smaller factories or intermediate producers which still
depend on work from larger factories had to operate to
fit in the overall production scheduling of the larger
factories. The issues facing them were therefore simi-
lar to those of thfeir predecessors in the earlier
period.
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20C. labor reouirements
Requirement for flexibility of production varied among
factories. For the larger ones with more predictable production
levels their concern was to mobilize to maintain and irTrease
the level of production. For the smaller ones their concern
was to be flexible enough to withstand fluctuation. But the
changed quality of labor and its substitutability (by capital)
made it difficult and undesirable for some entrepreneurs to
manipulate the labor factor in production.
The location and occupation mobility of the new labor
forc.e made it impossible for individual entrepreneurs to have
21
a dependable source of supply. They could no longer exploit
22
the high unemployment situation. Unlime in the earlier period
where entrepreneurs would not keep a large labor foce on a
permanent basis because of flexibility requirement, the workers
in the late 60's would not demand permanent relationship with
entrepreneurs because they would not lose to stay mobile in a
23
near-full-employment labor market.
Their occupational skill did not necessarily improve over
that of their predecessors but because of improved formal educa-
tion in an industrial setting young workers were more prepared
to adapt to technological innovation and observe industrial
disciplines. On the other hand they were less willing to work
beyond formal contractual obligations.
The following is a description of the types of wage relation-
ships and the quality and cuantity of labor reouired by the
industries.
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1. types of labor in terms of wage and employment relationship
a. "permanent" employees
Despite more predictable production levels entre-
preneurs would not invest in permanent workers as they
would in machinery and production systems. The following
reasons were cited.
i. Machinery were assets and permanent employees
were not, yet both constitite sunk-in investment
with varying degrees (mortgage for machinery and
contractual obligation to permanent employees).
It was therefore necessary to keep permanent
employees to a minimum.
ii. Machinery credits were easily available and
terms were generally favorable. Foreign machine
distributors were eager to give credit, probably
to deep themselves in business with shrinking
markets in the more advanced countries.
iii. Machinery did not depreciate drastically because
the machines were not yet sophisticated enough
to render them quickly out-of-date or non-trans-
ferrable.
iv. Labor shunned permanent employment which they
perceived as reducing their mobility. In fact
many entrepreneurs had to improve fringe benefits
(holidays, recreational facilities etc.) to
attract workers.
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v. If additional labor was needed in short notice
it was better to pay them higher wages than to
keep them through bad times.
As a result permanent employment was offered only
to administrative maintanence and highly skilled per-
sonnels as in the early 50's. In addition there was
a growing segment of management personnel. These, too,
were offered permanent employment to secure their
loyalty, skill and continuity. But unlike the earlier
period the relationship between these workers and the
entrepreneurs were much more formal and contractual.
They were no longer relatives and friends of the entre-
preneurs but were highly mobile sellers of skill.
b. "temporary" employees
This day-to-day basis employment became the most
common practice by late 60's. Workers worked in fac-
tories in shifts. In the early 50's such workers were
required to work a fixed number of hours or produce a
minimum number of products during the day. If they came
in late they would have make up for the lost time or
production by staying up late. But in the late 60's
scheduling of shifts was much more rigid and organised.
If a worker came in late he would not be allowed to
enter the factory and would lose a day's work. The
highly "structured" working condition was necessary
because of the high degree of internal process-coordina-
tion demanded by large-scale assembly line production
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methods. Getting to the factory on time became a
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most important requirement of workers. Workers
would be paid by the time worked, and quantity of goods
produced. Piece-wage was applicable for most workers.
Recruitment for temporary employees was a continuous
process for individual factories because the turn-over
rate was extremely high25 Recruitment notices were
posted in public places, and/or published in newspapers
(Hong Kong had about 50 daily newpaper), and/or shown
in cinema screens. Personnel relationships through
present employees were also used. Some demonstration
of skill was required but since operations had become
more standardized and simplified a short period (no
more than 2 weeks) of on-the-job training was sufficient
for any potential worker with the minimum formal
education.
c. piece-wage laborers
There was still work to be put-out (e.g. some sewing
and most of plastic assembly). But the importance of
put-out work had been drastically reduced by systemiza-
tion and mechanization. Many piece-wage workers would
not be required to come to the factories themselves to
collect work. Middlemen brought materials to them and
brought back the products to the factories. These
middlemen usually had transportation and had good work-
ing relationship with the factories. They had either
worked in these factories before or had relatives or
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friends working on the management level. Inspection
was done in the factories and workers paid directly by
the factories. Put-out workers usually worked for
only a few factories. The middlemen received a commis-
sion from the factories which was proportional to the
quantity of products they handled.
2. qualities of labor
a. skills
Skills were defined in much the same way as in the
earlier period --- that there was general correlation
of the skill levels with a/the period of apprenticeship,
b/the wage level, and c/the "prestige" accorded in the
workplace.
There was much less craftsmanship because works were
standardized even in the smaller factories. Jobs were
much more segmented. Industrial discipline was an
26important consideration. Given the generally improved
formal education level and the reduced emphasis on
craftsmanship the period of training was reduced. The
so-called semi-skilled jobs would require training of no
more than two months.
The following is a list of key personnel in the indus-
28
tries and their skill levels.
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shirt industry (chief manufacturer)
administrative
maintenance
product design
designer
sample sewer
quality control
inspector/
dispatcher
materials
products
process coordination
workshop mana.
foreman
technical staff
repairs
mech. & elec.
shop floor
cutter
sewer, joiner
collar
cuffs
rims
trunk
sleaves
pockets
button holer
button sewer
pressor
ironer
transport
plastic industry (chief manufacturer)
administrative
maintenance
product design
designer
draftsman
mould
design
fabrication
assembly
quality control
inspector/dispat
materials
products
process coordination
workshop mana.
foreman
technical staff
mixed skill
mixed skill
high-skill
high-skill
high-skill
high-skill
high to med.skill
high to med.skill
high to med.skill
medium-skill
high-skill
high to med.skill
high to med.skill
high to med.skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
medium-skill
med. to low-skill
med. to low-skill
medium-skill
mixed skill
mixed skill
high-skill
high to med.skill
high-skill
high-skill
high to med.skill
high-skill
high-skill
high to med.skill
high to med.skill
tool fab.& rep. high to med.skill
mech. & elec. medium-skill
shop floor
mould machine medium-skill
paint. & assem. med. to low-skill
trim./pol./pack.low-skill
transport medium-skill
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b. space, tools and machinery requirements of workers
Because of the high degree of internal process co-
ordination and cuality control required entrepreneurs
would prefer to have all activities carried out in the
factory premises. Even smaller factories would prefer
to use mechanized production methods to increase effi-
ciency. Entrepreneurs would normally provide the
necessary machinery for work in the factory. Indivi-
dual workers would find it too costly to invest on
power-operated machines. Put-out work was restricted
to operations where no machinery (e.g. plastic assembly)
or only manual machines were required (e.g.sewing).
The rationale for put-out work was not to minimize
capital outlay for machinery but to reduce space
27
reouirement of the factory premises.
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3. quantities of labor
Seasonal fluctuation was reduced both irn the aggre-
gate and among factories.
The proportion of piece-wage labor had reduced signi-
ficantly. But since the industries had grown at least
five time the absolute demand for piece-wage worker was
still large. The reduction was more significant in the
shirt manufacturing where put-out sewing had declined
drastically (30% down to 10%). In the plastic industry
where moulding had always been done in factories and
assembly work outside the factories the proportion of
piece-wage had not fallen as significantly as that in
the shirt industry (20% down to 10%).
types of workers in different trades:
shirt industry
chief manufacturer
permanent
temporary
piece-wage
skill mix
high-skill
medium-skill
low-skill
plastic industry
chief manufacturer
# workers payroll # workers payroll
30% 40% 40% 50%
60 55 50 45
10 5 10 5
100 100 100 100
of workers in different trades:
20% 45% 20% 40%
50 40 50 40
30 15 30 15
100 100 100 100
The skill-mix had shifted slightly to the low-skilled
category for the shirt industry. The products of the
shirt industry hnd not changed very significantly. They
were still catering for the middle and low price market.
But standardization and segmentation had created some
simple and low-skilled jobs.
On the other hand the improved sophistication of the
products and production processes in the -plastic industry
reauired higher proportion of skilled workers in the
designing, fabrication, management, planning and super-
vision categories. Machine operators performed jobs
of similar skill requirements as their predecessors, but
automation reduced their number. This shifted the skill-
mix towards the higher skill category.
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D. generalizations of labor requirements
I. high temporary and piece-wage labor ratiopermanent labor
This ratio was slightly lower than that of the early
50's, especially in the plastic industry. But the
ratio was still very high. However the composition
and meaning of the ratio had changed.
In the early 50's temporary and piece-wage labor were
of equal share in the total employment pattern (except
in plastic manufacturer and reprocessor where piece-
wage labor had always been low). But in the late 60's
temporary labor had largely replaced piece-wage labor.
This was because of the shifting of most production
activities back into the factories necessitated by
mechanization and systemization. Fewer and fewer work
were put-out.
Also the high ratio in the early 50's was primarily
a reflection of the high flexibility reouired by the
fluctuating market. It was the entrepreneurs who
decided to deep the ratio high. In the late 60's the
high ratio was the result of decisions of entrepreneurs
who would rather invest in machinery and production
systems to increase production efficiency and of
desires of workers who wished to remain mobile in a
near-full-employment labor market in search of better
opportunities. The importance of the element of
flexibility had reduced significantly.
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The fact remains that the ratio was high and with
the dramatic growth of the industries the absolute demand
for the different types of labor supply was also high.
2. medium skill reruirement
The skill-mix remained fairly stable with that of the
shirt industry shifting slightly towards 'the low-skilled
category and that of the plastic industry towards the
skilled category.
But the spectrum of skills had increased with the
adoption of more sophisticated machines and production
systems. However this applied to workers in the technical
or management spheres primarily. For workers in the
ordinary production operation mechanization and systemiza-
tion had reduced work to simple operations reauiring little
craftsmanship or occupational skill. Their education and
experience in an industrializing society had made them more
adaptable to routine work of this nature and to industrial
discipline. The older workers either moved towards the
higher skill technical jobs or remained in the smaller
factories where their craftsman skill was still useful.
3. production outside the factory
The most significant difference between the two time
periods was the reduction in the amount of put-out work.
Most of the work was done in the factory with the notable
exception of plastic assembly work where abundent space
was renuired.
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SECTION-': LOGIC OF LOCATION OF LOCATION
The examination of the logic of location will follow the
format of investigation in Chapter 3.
Although the industries had grown entrepreneurs were still
incapable of providing their own favorable production conditions
on an individual basis. Availability of favorable factor con-
ditions would therefore be the first consideration in location
choice. Cost variation would be considered subsequently.
Substitutability under critical situations would also be considered.
The following location factors will be discussed.
a. market
b. input factors
i. raw material
ii. capital
iii. land
iv. transportation
v. labor
c. external economies of scale and agglomeration
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A. market consideration
Unlike the early 50's when external market was the only
major consideration the late 60's saw the grwoth of internal
markets and the decline of the intermediate market.
1. external market
30
It was still by far the chief market. The price of
product was the same for all locations of production. Al-
though factories located much farther away from shipment
point the farthest distance between points of manufacture
31
and points of shipment was no more than 11 miles (compared
with 5 miles in the early 50's). With improved trans-
portation network this increased distance would not present
significant transport cost differences. Besides, trans-
port cost was only marginal to the total production cost.
The problems of tranpoprtation will be further discussed
under the appropriate heading.
2. intermediate market
This was becoming less important because most operations
were performed inside a single factory. Used-material
32
reprocessors and manufacturers of parts were gradually
phased out by systemized production methods. This was
particularly true of the shirt industry where practically
all processing was done under the same roof. For the
plastic industry there was still some assembly work to be
done by sub-manufacturers.
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However there were still a large number of factories
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doing surplus work for the bigger factories.. They were
much less systemized and mechanized. Small scale
transactions and instant deliveries were still vital. For
these the economies of agglomeration would still be
important.
3. internal market
This was a growing market for both the shirt and the
34
plastic industry. However products were sold through
retail distributors. Some of them sold only the products
of a single manufacturer but most sold products of different
manufacturers or many different kinds of products (e.g.
department stores). The location of retail and manu-
facture had the same relationship as that between point
of shipment to external market and manufacture, except
that instead of considering the distance between the fac-
tory and the warehouse the entrepreneur had to consider
the distance between the factory and the retail outlet.
Since all retail outlets (including their storage) were
within the urban areas transport cost variationwould not
be an important consideration. The availability of pro-
per transportation will be discussed under transportation
consideration.
-140-
B. raw material consideration3 5
There was little change in the supply pattern of raw
materials. Practically all of them were imported. The same
consideration as in the early 50's would be applied. There
was no location significance except in terms of transportation
availability which will be discussed under the appropriate.
heading.
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C. cap-ital consideration
1. cash outlay
The situation was similar to that of the early 50's
except that as factories grew larger and markets more
established banks were more ready to forward credit.
Smaller factories could also approach the government
sponsored "small business lopn fund", though the cum-
bersome administrative procedure did not encourage
application. On the whole there was little locational
variation both in the availability of credit and cost
of credit.
2. credits on materials
These were similar to those of the early 50's, that
there was no location variation.
3. credit on machinery purchase
Unlike the early 50's when machines and tools were
simple and crude, machinery used in the late 60's was
much more sophisticated and specialized (for large as
well as for small factories). Machines could now be
bought by instalments (not available in the early 50's).
Initial investment would not be too large though running
cost would increase. The rapid expansion of the indus-
tries with an uncertain long-term future (foreign restric-
tionism) made it attractive for entrepreneurs to use
modern machinery to increase their immediate efficiency
and to avoid heavy initial investment or sunk-in capital.
This changed drastically the production process and made
substitutability of capital for labor an attractive
alternative. But there was no direct location variation
in this respect. It's locational effect on labor will
be discussed under the appropriate heading.
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36D. land c-onsidai
1. availability of appropriate space, facilities and
infrastructure
New factories were larger (upwards of 3,000 sq.ft.)
and amenity requirements were more elaborate. The
structural conditions and spatial quality of older
residential areas were no longer suitable. Many built
their own factories. But most bought or rented multi-
story (5-15 stories high) flatted factory space from
factory building developers.
Unlike the early 50's when there was virtual chaos in
land-use control the late 60's saw legislations regulating
land-use. New areas were developed accordingto strictly
enforced land-use zoning regulations. Most industrial
areas were also created (Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan). But
the industrial-commercial-residential areas of the early
50's still existed. They became the older mixed land-
use urban areas by the late 60's.
Large factories would not find adequate spr'ce readily
available in older urban areas. When land was available
the cost would be high. Also improved systemization
and mechanization made economies of scale outweigh eco-
nomies of agglomeration associated with the older areas.
Usually newer industrial areas farther away from urban
centres could provide more space. The concerns in such
a location were the availability of labor and the efficiency
of the infrastructure and transportation systems. The
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main trade-off was the substitution of more, and possibly
cheaper, land for easier access of labor. Entrepreneurs
of large factories often found it easier to improve the mo-
bility of labor (to be discussed under labor consideration)
than to modify their land reouirements. Infrastructure
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in newer areas, especially in new towns, was often unreli-
able. Electricity supply was often cut short without prior
notice and water pressure was often inadequate to reach
higher floors. Transportation network efficiency was also
lower in more distant areas (to be discussed under trans-
portation consideration).
Smaller factories had more option as to the choice of
land. Their spatial reouirement was much less (still
around 3,000 sq.ft.). They would be tolerated in older
urban areas (including residential) as long as they did
not present serious fire hazard or impose heavy structural
londing, and as long as neighbors did not complain too much.
Most of the smaller shirt factories could meet such re-
cuirements. But plastic factories with their imflammable
materials h d more of a problem. These factories could
either locate in the older urban areas to exploit economies
of agglomeration or they could locate farther away in the
newer industrial Preas to exploit the lower land price.
However it must be noted that most of the smaller factories
were older factories. They had already located the older
areas or in areas that had grown old. Location considera-
tion for new factories in the Inte 60's belonged mostly to
larger factories.
2. cost of factory space
Land shortage was a very serious problem. Developable
flat land in Hong Kong was very limited. Reclamation from
the sea and levelling off hills were wxpensive operations.
Industrial land development was primarily the effort of
the private sector. Between 1950-1970 industrial floor
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space had increased dramatically. The cost of land had
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sky-rocketed and so had the competition for land. Much
of the older industrial areas had been redeveloped to
higher density and larger space. But these did not include
the older mixed-land use urban areas where industries first
developed.
The cost of factory space fell as it was farther away
40
from urban centres, measured along major artery roads.
There were large fluctuation in land prices among loca-
tions on Hong Kong island, the Kowloon area, the New Kow-
loon area and the New territories. Because Hong Kong
island and Kowloon were ceded to the British the lease
was much longer (from 75 years to 999 years). But land
in New Kowloon and the New Territories was leased up to
1998 only. Therefore land on Hong Kong island and Kow-
loon was much more expensive.
Factories space was difficult to find because of the
rapid industrial development. This undoubtedly pushed
up the price of factory space. In many cases trade-offs
between rent and other factors were not possible because
land options were severely limited. Entrepreneurs had to
be satisfied with any available land which could provide
the minimum conditions for production.
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E. trpnsportation consideration
1. materials and products
The transportation network was much improved by late
60's. Trucks and vpns had replaced the earlier diversed
modes of transportation. Trucks could get anywhere except
into souatter areas where there were no roads. The major
problem was traffic congestion in the old urban areas.
But since all shipment points were inside the old urban
areas (along the harbor) this was a universal problem.
However there was a serious obje6tion to locating in the
older urban areas regarding loading and unloading of goods.
The older areas were not designed for industrial use.
There were no service roads for industrial use. The main
roads were already congested. This made loading and un-
loading a very inconvenient and time consuming operation.
Trucks sometimes had to circle around the block stopping
a few minutes at a time in front of the factory to avoid
blocking up the traffic.
Aside from this the cost of transport was only marginal
to the total production cost.
2. personnel
Transportatio of workers was a much more serious problem
than that of transportation of goods and materials. Since
most workers now worked in factories instead of at home
they had to be transported if factories were far away from
where they lived. The mobility of the workers and the
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rigid shift schedule were the major factors here. With
improved locational and occupational- mobility of the workers
factories could not depend on location for adequate supply
of labor. On the other hand if factories were located far
away from.workers residence they would have to rely heavily
on efficient transportation systems to move the workers to
the factories.
41.
Public transportation had improved significantly.
Fares had not increased and were considered cheap compared
42
with the wage level. But the volume of workers to be
transported at peak hours was beyond the capability of the
public transportation system (especially when expansion was
restricted by fare control). Private transporters flou-'
rished. These ranged from taxis to mini-buses to large
buses. Most factories had their own bus service for
workers (the usual practice was for the factories to con-
tract transportatio out to private bus owners). This
became a standard working condition for many workers. In
this way factories could afford to locate farther away
from worker population concentrations. Transport cost
was still marginal to production cost.
However entrepreneurs would not rely solely on trans-
portation. They still preferred to locate near concen-
tration of labor whenever possible (given available land
at reasonable cost). Although they would not have all
their labor coming from the nearby labor supply concen-
tration they needed a basic reliable labor supply for the
'highly systemized producion process to function properly.
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Unlike the earlier entrepreneurs who could afford late
comers or absentee workers as long as they would make up
for the loss time or work, the entrepreneurs in the late
60's would find their production system disrupted if a
large enough number of workers did not follow a rigid -
schedule. Transport vehicles might break down or run
into traffic congestions. But if some basic level of
workers would be guaranteed from nearby lanbor supply
sources a more reliable work force could be counted upon.
Another more important consideration was the competition
for labor. For workers choosing between two identical
factories at different distances away they would choose
the one which they could walk to. This allow themselves
more flexibility than following a rigid bus schedule
everyday. In a near-full employment labor market this
was an important labor-incentive consideration.
TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATION IN THE LATE 60's
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F. labor consideration
Location implications of findings in labor renuirements
Pre discussed here.
1. availability
a. temporary and oiece-wage labor ratio was still high.
- permanent -labor
But the ratio had quite-different meaning from that of
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early 50's. Significant socio-economic changes had
occured to affect the mobility of labor.
i. transportation had improved44
New roads were built and existing roads improved.
Public transportation h d increased its efficiency
but not its price. Private transportation was
provided by entrepreneurs locating farther away
from urban centres.
ii. demographic charateristics had changed in favor
higher mobility 5
(a) Workers were younger. New families were
smaller. They had less social and family
responsibility than their parents.
(b) They were much better educated formally. They
were much more accustomed to the rigid indus-
trial disciplines. Given the standardized
skill reouirements of most jobs they had much
higher occupational mobility.
i11,. demand for labor was high46
Industrial growth was phenomenal. Unemployment
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was no longer a problem. There was a chronic
shortage of labor. Worker's had far more choice
of occupations than their predecessors.
47
iv. unions were weak
They were small and membership limited. They
could not exert control over the job market by
imposing union membership requirements. They
could not bargain effectively with entrepreneurs.
This left the workers mobile within the labor
market.
Unlike the early 50's there was no longer the large
concentration of unemployed. Public housing projects
in the late 60's representing concentrations of working
population with similpr labor quality were spread all
over. The location of factories near concentrations
of unemployed in the early 50's was a location strategy
to compensate for the lack of mobility of the labor force.
The location of factories near working population con-
centrations in the late 60's represented a different
location logic. It was an attempt to compete for the
highly mobile labor force by offering location inducement
to workers. A location near concentrations of working
population meant easier recruitment and more reliable
labor supply. To compete for labor by raising wages
was effective only in the short run because wage dif-,
ferentials would be levelled out quickly by competitors.
But an advantage in location would always remain effective
because such a location would always mean easier access
to (for) labor.
-153-
b. skill reouirement
With improved occupational mobility and increased
mechanization and systemization there was no longer
location consideration for special skill require-
ments of workers The earlier consideration of
housewife sewers or children plastic sorters and
assemblers was no longer relevant. As long as a
large concentration of labor population could be
reached there was no special consideration for dif-
ferent kinds of skills This applied not only to
the lower level labor force but also to the manage-
ment and supervisory level in the production process.
c. production outside the factory
Put-out work for the shirt industry had been re-
duced significantly. For the plastic industry much
of assembly work was still put-out. In many cases
agents or middlemen were used. They provided vehi-
cles for delivery and collection. This eleminated
the dependance on location. Some individual workers
would still come to factories to collect materials
or deliver products. This applied only to a small
number of factories located in the older areas.
2. cost of labor
There was little location variation in wages and
fringe benefits for the spme industry. New fac-
tories, regardless of their location, usually had
-154-
to raise wages or fringe benefits to attract labor
because they had to compete in a near-full employment
labor market. Since most of these factories were
located at the fringe areas for land consideration48
there seemed to be a general tendency for wages at
the fringe areas to be a little higher. But such
wage differentials would be quickly diffused through-
out the industry.
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G. external economies consideration
1. economies of scale
This became a more important consideration as fac-
tories became more mechanized and systemized. Factories
grew bigger. This spatial aspect is considered under
land consideration. Production process became more rigid.
Skill and other quality requirement of labor is considered
under labor consideration.
Economies of scale reeuired factories to be located
in fringe areas where land was more plentiful and cheaper.
On the other hand locations near working population con-
centrations were favored for reason of ready labor. This
often meant areas of higher land cost. For most large
factories the consideration of (availnbility and cost)
seemed to be more important.
2. agglomeration effect.
With systemization and consolidation of operations under
the same roof larger factories placed much less importance
on agglomeration effect. But smaller factories or fac-
tories of intermediate products still relied heavily on
the closeness of other supporting or purchaser factories.
External process coordination consideration was important
for them. However most of these factories were older fac-
tories already located in areas with industrial agglomera-
tions. New factories dependant on agglomeration effect
had to pay higher lpnd cost in order to locate in the older
49
areas.
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More stablized demands from established export markets
had reduced the significance of flexibility forlabor input.
Factories had grown larger. Production efficiency called
for systemization and mechanization.
a. Land had assumed an important position in location
decision because of the rigidity of space and amenity
requirements demanded by mechanization and systemiza-
tion and the immobility of land and its physical
attributes.
b. On the other hand improved labor mobility made loca-
tion consideration for labor a less important factor.
Location near labor population concentration was con-
sidered primarily as "second sourcing" only.
But for smaller factories operating-on the periphery of
the industry or cater for fluctuating internal markets, or
producing specific products for intermediate users labor flexi-
bility was still a paramount concern. It is true thrt the
proportion of smaller fpctories had reduced significantly but
the absolute number of such factories had nevertheless increased
50
with. the general growth of thei industries. New entry into
the industries for small entrepreneurs had become more difficult
but opportunities were still available for spin-offs from larger
factories. These smaller factories were important buffers for
the larger ones. An analogy can be drawn betweem the individual
piece-wpge workers in the early 50's and the small peripheral
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factories in the late 60's. They worked on different scales
but served the same function for the industry as a whole.
However not all small factories were surviving on the periphery
of the industries. Many were pioneers in experiments in
51
specific markets (internal as well as external). or specialized
52
products (intermediate as well as final). It is therefore
unrealistic to assume that they would be phased out by the
larger factories catering for established markets.
Location logic can be classified into two categories.
1. large factories which were highly mechanized and systemizedi
a. Land was the most important consideration (large
space at low cost).
b. Transportation was important in moving goods and
personnel.
c. Labor concentration was a preferred choice but not
a vital one.
2. small factories which were partially mechanized and
little mechanized:
a. Labor flexibility was vital but transportation had
reduced the location restriction a good deal.
b. Agglomeration was an important consideration for
process coordination.
c. Space recuirement was much more flexible.
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SECTION 4: EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
The pattern of existing industrial location is not use-
ful in the analysis of the location logic of the late 60's
because this will include all factories and not just new fac-
tories where their location logic reflected the socio-economic
situation of the time.. A location demand pattern is used
instead to represent the proper synthesis of the location logic.
Unlike the early 50's when land available for construction
(residential or industries) was still not a major problem, avai-
lability of land in the late 60's became the most critical con-
sideration.. In the early 50's factories operated in mixed land-
use areas or in modified residential buildings. The price of
land indicated the pattern of urbanization rather than that of
industrialization. Demand for industrial lnd was not a signi-
ficant factor in the price of land. By the late 60's demand
for industrial land had grown drastically and suitable land for
development had dried up. Moreover industrial land-use was
controlled. This restricted the competition of industrial land
to industrial users and at the same time severely accentuated
the..shortage of industrial land. Price of industrial land was
no longer distorted as a good indicator of the industrial demand
53
for land.
However location variation in the sales price (rent) of
factory space was a better indicator of the location demand of
Industries than land price itself. Land price could be distorted
by institutional constraints. Land in the same location would
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have the sales price per comparable factory space. But the
price of land might vary. For example, different plots of
land might hnve different permitted plot ratios. These
regulated the volume of floor space constructable and would
therefore affected the price of the land. A higher sales
price (rent) per factory space would indicate a higher demand
for a certain location. It is'therefore useful to equate
the sales price (rent) hierachy with the demand hierachy and
dompare this pattern of location demand with the conditions
of location factors existing in these locations.
Three qualificatioms must be considered.
I..In the older areas locations of factories did not res-
pond efficiently (in the economic sense) to rent levels.
Analysis of the p-ttern of demand (the rent level)
must be corrected to accommodate the following.
a. Rent level changed (uaually went up) after factories
located in an area. The initial location of the
factories (in the early 50's or later) might reflect
an optimum combination of conditions of production
factors and rent at the time. But such conditions
54
changed, and so did the rent level.
b. The inertia of relocation to other areas with com-
parable conditions of production factors and lower
55
rent might distort the demand pattern for a location.
c. Institutional restrictions might reduce the accessi-
bility of an area to new factories, such as in the
case of some mixed land-use areas where old factories
56
were permitted to stay.
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It is therefore important to distinguish between
existing areas of factories concentration and areas
of possible new factory locations. However, in many
cases the areas of new factory location would include
the older areas as well as the new areas.
2. In the new areas speculation by developers might dis-
tort the actual demand. This distortion would have
mattered if there was location discrimination in
speculation. But since speculation was a universal
problem in all new development areas the rent hierachy
could still adequately reflect the hierachy of location
demand.
3. The development in Hong Kong and in Kowloon must be
considered separately.
a. The developable areas in Hong Kong was-much more
severely restricted because of the rugged and steep
topography. As a result the industrial areas on
Hong Kong island were much smaller than those in
Kowloon. In fact about 90% of all industrial deve-
lopment was in Kowloon and the New Territories.
b. Land value in Hong Kong and part of Kowloon was much
higher for two reasons. Firstly the lease period
was much longer on Hong Kong isl nd because the
island was ceded to the British. (Leases ran from
75 years to 999years). Secondlythe development
terms of the leases were much more flexible on Hong
Kong island. The 999-year lease was nicknamed the
-163-
"unrestricted lease". Lease holders could follow
any pattern of development as they wished without
interference from zoning regulations (at least
theorectically). Therefore many industrial land
developers in Hong Kong island were more concerned
with securing a long-term and flexible lease than
the immediate industrial use of the development.
A SPECIAL CASE
opvth oint 1i Hong Kong was a very special case.
s h gh postion' on the demand erachy could have
been distorted by the flllowing factors.
1. It was an older area with heavy ethnic concentration
(refugees from northern China). This group did not
mix well with the local people or other refugees
from other parts of China. Most entrepreneurs lived
in the same area. It was one of the earliest in-
dustrial development area and it used to be lpbor
concentration for the earlier small industries.
There was great inertia against relocation. This
pushed up the rent level.
2. Development in the area was restricted by topography.
This was a universal problem on Hong Kong island but
the situation at North Point was much worse. Also
most of the later development was owner-occupier
large factory type. This severely limited the amount
of salable (rentable) factory space for small factories.
3. As North Point was close to the urban commercial
centres on Hong Kong island and was on the path of
the eastward expansion of the commercial core there was
strong incentive for real estate speculation. This
further pusher up the price of land.
With varying degrees such distortions were present in
all industrial locations on Hong Kong island. It would
therefore be more realistic to concentrate on development
pattern on the Kowloon area while keeping notice of the
peculiarities and irregularities of the pattern in Hong
Kong.
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We have identified 2 different sets of priorities of location
considerations for 2 different types of factories. For the large
factories the critical factors were land and transportation. For
the smaller factories they were labor and agglomeration effects.
We have also constructed a hierachy of location demands.
The conditions of the various factors of production will be
examined for each location to test empirically the logic of location.
In order to do this the following locations will be identified.
1. locations with unfavorable land (in terms of space suitable
for the different factories, cost is incorporated into the
demand pattern).
2. locations with unfavorable transportation (in terms of
loading and unloading).
3. locations with unfavorable agglomeration effects.
4. locations with favorable labor condition..
(Locations with unfavorable labor condition would be dif-
ficult to map because of improved mobility of labor, in-
creased efficiency of transportation and spread of labor
concentrations through housing projects. However it is
possible to map areas with definite labor advantage..
In the observation Hong Kong and Kowloon will be considered
separately because of the significant difference in land value
due to lease conditions which is a non-industrial consideration.
Demands of large and small factories will also be distinguished.
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The following observations are made.
SMALL FA CTORIES
1. Those locations with high demands were in the older
mixed land-use areas (North Point and Western District
-in Hong Kong and Shum Shui Po and Tai Kok Tsui in
Kowloon). Those with the lowest demands were in the
new industrial areas (Kwun Tong).
2. Space conditions were suitable for all locations.
3. -Transportation conditions (in terms of loading and un-
loading) varied. But all the areas with high demands
(North Point and Western District in Hong Kong and Shum
-Shui Po and Tsi Kok Tsui in Kowloon) did not have favora-
ble transportation conditions.
-4. Agglomeration effects were favorable for all areas except
the lowest demand area (Chai Wan in Hong Kong and Kwun
Tong in Kowloon).
5. In the highest demand location in Hong Kong (North Point)
-labor conditions were not favorable in the sense that
:no-large resettlement or low cost housing project were
elose by. On the other hand the other lower demand
-areas in Hong Kong had favorable labor conditions.
In Kowloon the highest demand area (Shum Shui Po and
-Tai Kok Tsui) also had the most favorable lpbor condition
with resettlement, low-cost housing projects and concen-
ztration of private residential for low-income.
But in the low demand area of Hung Hom and Mau Tau Kok
in Kowloon labor conditions were not definitely favorable.
This might be the reason for its low position on the demand
hierachy. Nevertheless they demonstrated the fact that
although labor in the immediate area was important it was
not as vital as it had been in the early 50's. (If one
refers back to the early 50's one would discover that this
area had all favorable conditions except for labor). It
had not developed in the 50's. But the severe shortage
of industrial land made this area acceptable in spite of its
"comparative" lack of immediate labor. Its low position on
the demand hierachy may signify that labor was still of
considerable importance.
LARGE FACTORIES
1. Both in Hong Kong and in Kowloon the high demand areas
were the older industrial areas.
2. Space conditions were suitable for all locations.
3. Transportation conditions were also favorable. This can
be explained by the fact that these locations were all away
from urban centres where loading and unloading would not
be a problem. Areas designed for industrial use or any
newer areas were considered acceptable in this respect.
.4. Agglomeration effects were favorable in the high demand areas.
5. Labor conditions varied. The highest demand area in Hong
Kong (North PointY did not have the most favorable labor
conditions. But the high demand areas in Kowloon all had
favorable labor conditions.
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a. Industrial areas in Hong Kong were small and the
absolute demand for labor was not great.
b. the high demands for factory space in an area in
Hong Kong might not result from a genuine industrial
need but from real estate development priorities.
c. Labor mobility on Hong Kong island might be higher
because the urban area was small.
For small factories the demand hierachy and their locational
characteristics are as follows.
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For large factories the demand hierachy and their
characteristics are as follows.
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SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
By the late 60's the shirt and plastic industries had
established export markets. The industries had grown and
had diversified. There were the larger factories which were
mechanized Pnd systemized. There were the smaller factories
which had mechanized but still retained flexibility in
production.
Sociov.!economic conditions had changed. Labor became
much more mobile. Capital investment in machinery became more
readily available. Land shortage was a universal problem.
Market was not.
The "pure" laissez-faire development conditions existing
in the early 50's were no longer present. Government inter-
vention in the supply and control of land, regulation of labor
and massive housing of population distorted the otherwise
"natural" development of industries and the subsequent logic
of their location.
The most important factor to consider in the location
pattern of industries in the late 60's was land. Given the
growth of all industries at phenomenal speed the scarce urban
land'was taken up rapidly. Large factories which had little
concern for agglomeration and ready labor could find it easier
to move to new towns in the New Territories. But small fac-
tories had to find production space in the urban areas. They
would have to take up Pny land available to them. This there-
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fore created some confusion in the pattern of location.
However the logic on the whole was confirmed by empirical
evidence --- that land (space) was the most important con-
sideration for both large and small factories, that large fac-
tories would consider transportation important, that small
factories would consider agglomeration effects important, and
that labor requirements were relaxed for both the large and
small factories.
1. For the larger factories the major factors seemed to
be space availability and transportation consideration.
There was a general tendency for factories to locate
farther and farther from existing urban centres.
Agglomeration effects and labor conditions were
favorable for most locations with higher demand (except
North Point in Hong Kong). This may indicte that even
for the larger factories agglomeration and labor con-
sideration still played an important part.
2. For the smaller factories the indication of the de-
pendency on agglomeration effect was apparent. Trans-
portation was obviously not the major concern. Although
the evidence in all the larger industrial areas in
Kowloon (Shum Shui Po, Tai Kok Tsui and San Po Kong) shows
that locations with large and ready labor concentration
were highly demanded, the situation on Hong Kong island
was different. There could be a number of reasons.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
the Hong Kong experience
policy implications
housing policy as leverage in
manpower mobilization
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THE HONG KONG EXPERIENCE
Cheap labor was the comparative advantage for industrial
development in Hong Kong since the early 50's. This pro-
bably explains why labor-intensive manufacturing industries
grew in Hong Kong, replacing those areas with more expensive
larbor costs. This research accepts the premise that these
industries would necessarily exploit the labor quality in Hong
Kong but tries to investigate how this exploitation if effected
locationally in a micro-urban context.
The findings of this research demonstrate that location
factors (including labor) are heterogenous in a micro-urban
sense. They vary locationally in quality and/or in cost.
Their- qualities are dynamic and change with the process of urban-
ization and industrialization. And these are inter-related
qualitatively and affect one another.
Labor locations in Hong Kong were results of the pattern
of urbanization in general and that of housing in pprticular.
Housing in this instance included not only the physical aspects
of public housing projects (resettlement and low-cost) but the
whol.e process of residential settlement guided or unguided by
government action. In the early 50's urbanization policy was
one of non-intervention except for law and order. Refugees
"naturally" concentrated at the urban fringes where public land
was available for sauatting and public services were the closest
possible. Industries came later. They needed the labor of
the refugees. But the labor was immobile because of demographic
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and personal characteristics and the pattern of urbanization.
Factories therefore located close to labor concentrations.
Later the whole socio-economic position and aspiration of the
labor force changed. The pattern of urbanization and public
housing also helped to increase the mobility and accessibility
of the labor force. The location dependence on labor con-
centration was lessened.
The housing element was very strong in determining the
pattern of labor concentration. But the imprct of housing on
industrial location cannot be examined outside the context of
urbanization, industrialization and social development. The
physical phenomenon of industrial location is only a physical
manifestation of the underlying socio-economic logic where the
physical pattern of urbanization and housing is but one of the
many related factors.
The labor quality of a population concentration is meaning-
ful only when the relationship between the labor force and the
employer industry is established. A case in point is the
housewife workers in the early 50's. If the industries did
not use the labor quality of the housewife workers housewives
would not have any labor va lue to the industries. But the
labor auality of the housewife workers could be exploited only
because the pattern of urbanization hpd on the one hand created
population concentrations with this quality of labor and on the
other had placed them in such a way that factory space was
available close to them. If the refugees were scattered through-
out the urban area or if no factory space was available near
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refugee concentrations then labor would not have been tapped.
This would mean that either the production process would have
to be changed or more likely that the specific types of industries
would not develop.
The finding of this research demonstrates that the location
of labor was the chief determinant of the location of manufacturing
industries at a certain stage of socio-economic development. But
the more important finding is that the pattern of urbanization
made it possible for industries to exploit the unique quality of
the labor force. The pattern of urbanization therefore created
working population concentrations that had matching labor quality
reauired by the industries.
In the discussion of industrial location in labor terms it
is irrelevant to speak of the simple, one-way causal relation-
ships between urbanization (labor concentration), industrializa-
tion (labor reouirement) and social development (labor quality).
Growth of the manufacturing industries, the use of the particular
labor ouality and the concentration of the refugee population
were distinct and inter-related phenomena. The development
of the industries cnme qbout after a period of trial and error.
The type of manufacturing industries thpt finally flourished
represented a successful combination (unification) of these
factors which had been present all the time but were latent.
The location of the industries was only the physical manifesta-
tion of the underlying logic of the urbanization-industrialization-
social development inter-relationship.
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Later, the changes in the climate for industrialization
(e.g. established markets, changed industrial frontiers,
industrial diversification etc.), the pattern of urbanization
(e.g. housing, transportation, institution control of land-.
use etc.), and social development (e.g. compulsory education,
labor laws etc.) a new set of urbanization industrialization-
social development relationship emerged. Again location of
factories reflected physically the logic of this relationship.
It may also be recognized that this new relationship-was
not created independently of the old. It was the interaction
between the different components of the old within a simul-
taneously and correspondingly evolving macro -physio-socio-
economic environment that produced the new set of relationship.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. In the process of socio-economic development certain
elements in urbanization (population concentration,
transportation, land-use pattern etc.), industrializa-
tion (types of industries, production processes, labor
requirements etc.) and social development (education,
demographic and personal characteristics etc.) are
qualititively and logically inter-related. Depending
on the particular situation of the time any one of
these elements can be crucialto the process of develop-
ment. In the case of Hong Kong in the early 50's
successful industrial take-off was created by entre-
preneurs who could unify the appropriate elements in
urbanization, industrialization and social conditions.
The relative non-interference of the government helpful
to demonstrate even more clearly the "pure" logic of
the urbanization-industrialization-social development
inter-relationship.
This has important policy implications. Effects
of policy actions are not restricted to the artificially
and narrowly defined "area of policy concern". It is
not stretching too far to hypothesise that if the urban-
ization policy of the early 50's in Hong Kong was to
disperse the refugees the industrialization of Hong Kong
would never have come about, at least not in the way
it had.
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Location of labor concentration is one of the many
elements in the pattern of urbanization but it can be
an important element in industrialization. It is
therefore inappropriate to regard location of population
as an issue in urbanization only, not when economic
development depends upon it.
2. The location of population concentration became a much
less important element in the location of manufacturing
industries in the late 60's. This serves to demons-
trate the dynamics of the urbanization-industrialization-
social development inter-relationship.
Labor concentration helped the industries to develop.
The development of the economy in general and of the
industries in particular made it possible and necessary
to change the pattern of urbanization and social develop-
ment This in turn changed the production priorities
of the industries. For some production processes land
and transportation became far more important considera-
tion than labor concentration. But without the earlier
production process the latter urbanization-industriali-
zation-social development inter-relationship would not
have come about.
In terms of policy implication this dynamics mean
that leverages in economic development are always
shifting. In the case of industrialization in Hong
Kong'the early importance of labor concentration hpd
given way to land and transportation consideration.
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The physical aspects of urbanization usually changes
very slowly. A housing project or road takes long
time to complete and once it is built it tends to stay
permanently. In many instances this physical inertia
in time and space serves to distort the logic of the
urbanization-industrialization-social development inter-
relationship. For example, it would be difficult to
isolate the logical basis for the continual existence
into the late 60's some of the "inefficient" factories
with prodiction methods and labor requirements similar
to those of the early 50's. But the huge housing
projects near older urban centres where these factories
were normally located might serve to provide the indus-
tries with a dwindling yet substa ntial labor force
to support a limited number of "inefficient" factories.
Planners can either anticipate or respond to changing
relationships. But there are difficulties in both
approaches. Anticipation requires clear insight into
the trend of development and involves prior commit-
ments that will not yield immediate payoffs. Res-
ponding to the existing condition is often equivalent
planning by crisis. The lag between decision and
implementation renders obsolete any physical strategy
the moment it is applied.
If the inertia of physical aspects of urbanization
is overwhelming it may be necessary to consider non-
physical strategies. For example, housing projects
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may be re-allocated and use of roads may be restricted.
In Hong Kong many earlier housing projects at urban
centres are undergoing a process of de-population. Of
course this policy is not conceived to account for the
new urbanization-industrialization-social development
inter-relationship. Rather it is an effort to improve
the spatial standards of housing. Some households
are relocated elsewhere, the remaining are offered
larger units combined from smaller ones. But such
"housing" policy is bound to reduce the supply of labor
to some "inefficient" factories located near these
housing projects. This again, is an illustration of
the inter-relatedness of the different policy concerns.
3. The development of an industry is not a homogeneous
process in terms of labor requirements. The experience
in Hong Kong shows that as the industries grew the types
of products, the production processes and labor require-
ments became more and more diversified. Each branch
in this diversification bore a special urbanization-
industrialization-social development inter-relationship
which was reflected physically in the location of
factories.
In terms of policy implication this means that the
severing of any link along the inter-relationship chain
would affect the viability of the corresponding branch
of industries. This gives leverages to weed out or to
reinforce certain industrial operations. In order to
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do this the the planner will have to identify the
critical elements in the specific chain as well as
the effect of action on other chains. There may be
structural relationships among the different branches
of the industries. The interactions among them are
crucial and beyong the scope of this research. It
is sufficient to point out that urbanization can some-
times be a useful leverage in industrial and manpower
planning.
This research has demonstrated the inter-relatedness and
dynamics of the process of urbanization, industrialization and
social development. Housing for the urban poor can be an
important policy element in urbanization consideration. But
if housing policy should go beyond the mere provision of physical
of the housing (urbanization) process. On the other hand eco-
nomic planners concerned with manpower mobilization must not
overlook the crucial relationship between the process of urban-
ization and industrialization.
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HOUSING POLICY AS LEVERAGE IN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION
The housing process is an important element in the overall
process of urbanization and socio-economic development. The
housing process for an individual in this research refers to
the whole process of "having" (finding, securing, improving and
transferring etc.) one's shelter and shelter for one's own, and
relating it to the socio-economic situation of the individual
or individual household (or any other appropriate socio-economic
unit).
The experience in Hong Kong has shown that housing can
constitute important leverage in the mobilization of labor supply
for the development of industries.
Housing policies may range from government construction,
finance, and management of housing projects to tolerance of
squatter areas; from rent control to mortgage subsidy; from
building code enforcement to building material price control.
primarily policies deal with either production or distribution
or consumption of the housing stock (service).
a. In the production of housing, which includes addition,
elimination, preservation and modification of the
housing stock (service) the volume, scale, location
and timing of housing action (or non-action) affect
the volume and location etc. of the labor supply.
. b. In the distribution of housing allocation and relocation
policies (no policy) determine the demographic and
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personal characteristics of the population, which in
turn determine the labor quality of the housed ---
skill level, ability to work and willingness to work.
c. In consumption policies (or no plicy) which govern
the use of the housing stock (service) standards of
housing may affect the possibility of using the housing
for economic production purposes. Tenure, security
of possession and ease of transfer etc. affect labor
mobility of the housed.
The following is a schematic diagram showing the possible
links between housing policy and manpower mobilization. Further
researches into these links will constitute the major effort of
the author. , - - -
HOUSING MANPOWER MANPOWER MANPOWER
POLICIES ELEMENTS ISSUES IN + CRITERIA &
IN POLICIES HOUSING MEASUREMENT
technology
construction &
rehabilitation
operation &
production management mployment volume
maintenance &
repair location
output specifications
volume, scale, training & timing
location, timing development
distributio & standards skill
stock specifications
same as in output ability to
llocation criteria labor
income, occupation, reservoir willingness
age, sex, house-
consumptio hold & housing to work
characteristics
elocation criteria on-site mobility
same as in alloca. manpower
ncome-redistribution activities
criteria
utility criteria
work
S
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER 1
1. Shekeipmei was one of the squatter areas in the late 40's
and the early 50's. Before the big fire on Christmas Eve,
1953 there were about 40,000 population in the area, mainly
refugees. Two-story row housing was constru-cted to house
those displaced by the big fire. Later these were replaced
by six-story H-shaped resettlement blocks. By the end of
the 50's the total population in the area was estimated to
be 80,000 which included the squatter area still existed
around the resettlement project. New land for construction
of more resettlement buildings was obtained by levelling the
adjacent hills and relocating the squatters. By the end of
the 60's the total population was estimated to be 120,000.
2. Most of them yere refugees from China. They came from urban
areas (cities) in China, especially from Canton and Shang-
hai. Many of them were merchants, industrialists, profes-
sionals and government officials.
3. The normal work shift in factories was 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.
However the shift hours were not normally strictly adhered
to by the factory as well as by the workers themselves.
But the loss work would have to be made up by staying longer
in the factory than the normal shift.
4. Many of them had occupational skills already (such as sewing
for housewives).
5. Practically all households had children or housewives work-
ing in economic productive activities (in factories, in con-
struction sites, in shops and as hawkers etc.).
6. see "process coordination", Chapter 3, p.6 4-6 5.
7. see "the industries", Cahpter 3, p.53-60.
8. Over 55% worked in their near vacinity (for a typical squat-
ter/resettlement area). Golgar, 0.J., Thesis (PhD), Univer-
sity of Hong Kong, 1969, p. 374.
Over 3/4 of the workers of a typical manufacturing factory
came from the near vacinity (15 miniutes' walk).--- Reported
by entrepreneurs interviewed.
9: The growth process was measured by the increase in real
income of the average individual workers and the average
households in the labor concentration areas, and also the
increase in the number of factory establishments and the
number of workers employed.
CHAPTER 2
I. such as economic base theory, growth pole theory etc.
2. such as the central place theory, gravity model and shift
and share model etc.
3. such as comparative advantage theory, minimum production and
delivery cost theory and maximum market area theory etc.
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4. Entre preneurs are assumed to be "economically rational".
They would seek to maximize proftis within perceived cons-
traints.
5. A. Weber: Theory of Location of Industries, Chicago,
University of Chicage Press, 1929.
6. E. Hoover: The Location of Economic Activities, New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1948.
7. It is further assumed that they do not vary over space.
8. In an endeavor to build a general 'pure theory' of location,
one that is applicable in any economic or political system,
Weber accepts only those influences that seem to have uni-
versal application irrespective of economic and political
circumstances. Consequently, both local and central govern-
ment activity are excluded from consideration. The cost
of capital is disregarded because variations in interest
rates are the result of institutional factors which vary
between nations, for example, as between socialist and
capitalist countries. Climate and entrepreneurship are
discounted on the grounds that they affect too few industrial
location to warrant their inclusion.
9. Transport costs are made up of two components, terminal costs
and line and haul costs. The former include the cost of
warehouses, docks, offices and maintenances, the latter
include fuel and wages incurred by drivers and crew.
10. For more complex location problems, Weber woud use the
Varignon frame. Weights ecuivalent to the unite transport
cost of each component are suspended by threads which run
over rollers at the edge of the frame. The threads are tied
together at their other end, representing the plant. Where-
ver this point representing the plant comes to rest, this
is the eouilibrium, and the point of least production cost.
The Varignon frame is known as a mechanical or force table
analogue model.
11. Pricing policy is the method by which transport costs on
the delivery of goods is calculated. The,-assumption is
that the delivered price of a commodity is the factory price
plus the freight rate, which although not precisely pro-
portionate to distance, nevertheless is heavily influence
by distance. This is not always the case. Hoover was
aware of the existence of other, discriminatory, pricing
policies, but paid them scant attention since he regarded
-them as exceptional.
12. Writing in 1924, Fetter investigates the size of market areas
under varying assumptions. Since the success of a plant
is directly related to the volume of its sales, each manu-
facturer evolves a strategy to undercut the price of his
competitor's products, thereby increasing the size of his
market area, and therefore profits. Many strategies are
possible, but Fetter sees them all as variations in produc-
tion and transport costs. Fetter, Frank A.: "The Economic
Law of Market Areas", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 39,1924, p.520-9.
13. A. Losch: The Economics of Location, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1954.
-190-
14. Weber's fundamental error, Losch argues, is to seek the
lowest cost location. "This is as absurd as to consider
the point of largest sales as the proper location. Only
the search for the place of greatest profit is right."
-A. Losch: The Economics of Location, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1954, p.29.
15. Schaffle in 1878 pointed out that industries are attracted
to markets in direct proportion to the size of the markets,
as measured, say, by their population, and in inverse.pro-
portion to the square of the distance between the market.
This can be expressed by -the formula: Migm PiPJ
where i and j are the two markets, d2
Mij is the interaction between markets,
Pi and Pj are the population of the two markets and d is
the distance between them. An extension of this model is
the breaking point theory. This predicts the position of
the market area boundary between towns of unequal size by
the use of the formula: M = dij / 1 + /Ti/p where M is the
distance of the breaking point from the smaller town, dij is
the distance between the towns Pi is the population of the
larger town and Pj is the population of the smaller town.
16. The reality of the Loschian landscape has been attacked by
W. Isard on the grounds that concentration of population at
the metropolis would result in a parallel concentration of
market areas. The size of market area needed to generate
sufficient demand to justify the production of a good is
very much smaller in cities than in rural areas. Assuming
the same size of plant, rural market areas are thus very
much larger than those in cities, with the consequence that
Losch's hexagons become grossly distorted. Isard also points
out that the Loschian system does not tPke localized raw
materials into account, and observes that rich and poor zones
may also take the form of concentric rings round cities.
17. E.R. Rawstron: "Three Principles of Industrial Location",
Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 1958,
p. 135-45.
18. D.M. Smith: "A theoretical Framework for Geographical Studies
of Industrial Location", Economic Geography, 1966, p.95-113.
19. Rawstron believes that the examination of the structure of
costs and their variation through space is a more realistic
initial approach than principles based on weight-loss, weight-
gain, or auantity of materials handled per worker. The
plant will be more restricted in its choice of location when
the cost of at least one of the components in the cost
structure varies appreciably from place to place, if this
variation forms a large proportion of total costs. Only
those component parts of the cost structrure that are likely
to vary from place to place need be examined; these include
labor, materials, marketing, land and capital. Power is
considered with materials and transport with each component,
where relevant.
20. Smith develops Rawstron's ideas on the existence of margins
of profitability with the construction of what he calls a
space cost curve. Demand and price are held constant while
average costs vary from place to place. The average cost
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curve is the space cost curve. Profits can be obtained
when the space cost curve is below price. The model can
easily accommodate change, whether this be in terms of
price, costs, managerial skill or taxation.
21. A. Pred: Beh.vior and Location: Foundations for a Geogra-
phic and Dynamic Location Theory, Part I, Lund Studies in
Geography, Series B, 1967.
22. To show how behavior may influence location, Pred cons-
tructs a behavioral matrix by developing D.M. Smith's
space cost curve and margins of profitability.
23. There are exceptions, notably are the location factor studies,
industrial type studies and area studies.
24. B.H. Stevens and A. Brackett: Industrial Location, a Review
and Annotated Bibliography of Theoretical, Empiricnl and
Case Studies, Regional Science Research Institute, Phila-
delphia, 1967.
CHAPTER 3
1. E. Hambro: The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong,
Report submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Holland, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1955, p.18.
2. Op. cit., p.165. - .
55% of the male population was between 22-60 and 45%
between 22-44.
3. Op. cit., p.167.
35% of the refugees belong to single person households.as
opposed to 5% of the local population.
4. Op. cit., p.1.51.
65% of the refugees were Cantonese as opposed to over 90%
of the local population Cantonese.
5. Op. cit., p. 4 7-4 8 .
Unemployment was 38% among refugees.
6. Op. cit., p.176-179.
51% of the refugees had secondary or higher eduction as
opposed to 18% of the local population.
7. The total export in 1953 was HK$635 million (as opposed to
HK$4,427 million in 1964), and only 30% of that consisted
of locally manufactured goods. The number of factory
establishments and workers employed are as follows.
(Hong Kong Government: Hong Kong Annual Report, 1953)
year establishments workers
1948 1,266 63,873
1949 1,426 83,571
1950 1,752 91,986
1951 1,961 95,207
1952 2,088 98,126
1953 2,208 100,776
- However the number of employment was often understated
(as much as 55%), especially for piece-wage workers and
children for the smaller factories in the earlier periods.
(Dwyer, D.J.: The Small Industrial Unit in Hong Kong:
Patterns and Policies, University of Hull, 1967, p.20-22)
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8. The shirt industry was not classified separately from the
rest of the garment industry. The classification was
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 24:
manufacturing of wearing apparel except footwear. The
classification included shirts, women's dresses, pyjamas,
rainwears, jackets and sl-cks and fashion industry. The
shirt industry made up about A the garment industry in the
early 50's. The classification was later changed to
ISIC 3220 in the late 60's.
year establishments workers
1951 44 420
1952 50 1,702
1953 60 2,421
1954 76 3,401
1955 99 4,261
1956 182 7,326
1957 198 9,627
1970 1,630 91,154
The chief manufacture was men's shirt,size 13.5-16. 80%
of the manufactured goods were exported to the United Kingdom,
Australia, Africa, Malaysia Thailand and Burma. The
total export in 1956 was HK.60 million and it was the 4th
largest export item (grand total of all manufactured goods
for export was HK3663 million in 1956).
9. The production of shirts was so insignificant that it did
not appear on the official or semi-official statistics until
1954.as a separate item.
10. The plastic industry was classified as ISIC 39: manufac-
turing industries not elsewhere classified: plastic ware in
the early to mid 50's. The classification was later changed
to ISIC 3560: manufacturing of plastic products not else-
where classfied. The industry included plastic flowers,
toys, utensils (cullinery, combs, soap box, stationery,
hanger for clothes, cigarette box, tooth brush, glass frame
clips, wall panels etc.) and products for other industrial
users (tooth brush handle, flash light accessories, clock
face, bottle stopper, syringe, lamp shade etc.).
yea establishments workers
1951 9 131
1952 14 247
195 17 310
1954 :26 391
1955 43 844
1956 91 2,146
1957 114 3,272
1970 2,379 711801
The growth rate of the industry was 60% annually. 90% of
the manufactured goods were exported to Southeast Asia, Aus-
tralia, Middle East, South Africa, South America, U.S. and
England. The total export was HK$7 million in 1954 amid a
grand total of all export of HK$628 million. The large to
small factory ratio was 1 to 20.
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11. Toys weighed usually 3-6 ounces, flowers 1.5-3 ounces.
12. The earlier materials were celluoid, cellulose acetate and
polystyrene.
13. It accounted for about 1/4 the total employment in the
industry with mainly women and children workers.
New plastic grains were sold at HK$6-7 a pound. This made
the reprocessing of waste.profitable. In the late 60's
to early 70's the price of new plastic dropped to HK$0.6-0.7
a pound (before the Arab oil embargo) making the reprocessing
industry extremely unprofitable.
14. Overseas connections had been well established during the
entrepot era but the shirt the plastic industry were new
industrial ventures. Besides there were severe competition
from Japan for both the industries.
15. For the shirt industry most of the orders were under ten
thousand dozens. For the plastic industry most of the
orders were under HKr$100,000.
16. It was not uncommon for some factories to have no work 7
during the lean months. In such cases surplus work would
be solicited from other factories. Such would be very
difficult during the lean months.
17. When a short-notice order was received it meant more than
mobilizing sufficient labor force. Materials hrd to be
purchased and machinery had to be ready. Often a notice of
4 months meant only 2 months of actual shop floor production
with the other 2 months spent in waiting delivery of materials.
18. Total capital investment ranged from HKp10,000 to HK$100,000
for most factories. (initial investment only)
19. In the case of the shirt manufacturing industry shirts and
underwears had already been produced for local consumption.
In the case of the plastic industry metal workers and
machine operators would be recruited from other metal-works
industries. There were also the transportation, packaging,
printing and publishing industries etc. which had existed
to help the entrepot trade activities.
20. Non-adherence to contract delivery dates had been cited as
the main complaints of buyers. The record of Hong Kong
were generally regarded as the best among all countries
exporting similar goods. This included Japan, and other
European countries where the problem of unionized labor was
cited to be responsible for many of the delays.
21. The collar was sewn by male workers and the rest of the whole
shirt was manufactured by female workers. The ironing,
buttoning, packing were done by female workers and children.
22. The moulding machine operators were male workers. Trim-
mers, assemblers and packers were female workers. The
ratio between male and female workers was I to 4. This
did not include administrative and maintenance staff.
23. Most medium size factories had some sort of crude flow chart
to -guide the production process. Freauently these were
sketched out on blackboards and would be revised when needs
arose.
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24. Here ethnicity played an important part. This probably
explains why many branches of the plastic industry tended
to be dominated by one ethnic group (the Chiu Chau people).
25. This obviously depended on the willingness of the labor force
to accept stringent employment terms made necessary by the
tight labor market brought about by the sudden influx of
refugees as well as the political and economic changes in
China and the rest of the World.
26. The choice of technologies open to the entrepreneurs was
limited by the condition for competition (comparative
advantage of Hong Kong). As a matter of fact much higher
technology was employed during the unsuccessful first
attempt at industrial take-off.
27. Industrial discipline in the early to mid 50's evolved from
the urban and commercial disciplines which most of the labor
force was familiar with. Employment relationships were
personal and reciprocal.
28. see "background", Chapter 3, p.4 8-4 9.
29. An employer would be required to serve at least one month
notice for dismissal of a permanent employee. But more
importantly permanent employment offered by an employer
often meant the respect for the employee and its indispen-
sability. Permanent employee status was considered
attractive by many workers. During the period of high
unemployment in the early to mid 50's a permanent job would
give the much needed economic security.
30. For example, the cutter was responsible for minimizing the
wastage on cloth. His care and ingenuity in cutting cloths
would mean important savings to the entrepreneur.
31. Newly established factories would try to attract experienced
and skilled workers. But the more serious competition
came from the skill personnel themselves Many of them
would be tempted to set up their own business if given the
opportunity. Establishing a personal and congenial rela-
tionship (one way was by offering permanent employment)
with these personnel would reduce the risk of losing
valuable staff.
32. This was a traditional Chinese business practice.
33. These employees would be dismissed without prior notice.
Although in later periods three to seven days notice were
required for dismissal. They came to the factory on a
day-to-day basis. If there was no more work to be done
they would be informed the day before. However informal
communication systems were well developed so that workers
would know way in advance when and where they would be needed.
34. The normal shift was 8 hours. There could be one, two or-
three shifts accofding the demand. If workers came in
late for one shift they would normally be allowed to stay
later to make up for the loss time, but not if other workers
from the next shift would come in to use the machinery.
Many workers worked more than one shift at a stretch. One-
and-a-half shift-was-the usual practice.
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35. Recruitment notices would be put up at bus stops, street-
lamp posts and street-facing walls of buildings.
36. These were workers who would be paid by the quantity of
work done. For example, sewers in the shirt industry would
be paid by the dozens of shirts or parts of shirt sewn,
assemblers in the plastic industry would be paid by the
dozens or twelves of dozens of plastic products assembled,
and sorters in the plastic reprocessing industry would be
paid by the weight in pound of plastic wastes sorted and
washed.
37. This was much more freouent during high seasons. During
low seasons few work would be put-out.
38. Space was more readily available in sauatter areas where
most of the structures were single story. The roofs would
be used (e.g. for drying plastic wastes), and there were
often small yards. Public open spaces were often used.
These included large construction sites and recreation areas.
39. The wage levels were as follows.
skilled workmen----------HK$6.00-$8.50
semi-skilled workmen-----HK$5.00-$6.50
unskilled workmen--------HK$3.50-34.00
These were the general daily wage levels according to skill.
There was no separate statistics of wage levels for the
plastic and shirt industry. But entrepreneurs and workers
interviewed agreed that these were quite correct, with the
exception that some unskilled workmen probably received as
low as HK$1.50 per day.
40. The skill-mix was confirmed by over 70% of the entrepreneurs
interviewed. The detail breakdown might vary from firm to
firm but the overall ppttern remained similar among firms.
42. Permanent employees had fixed basic salery. During bad
times they would receive a reduced salery. The reduction
could range from 10% to 50%. If there was deep recession
the workers would be dismissed without compensation. But
the practice of multiple employment (even when available)
was not common.
41. As a rule factories with better established market and
larger output had more permanent employees. But the fluc-
tuation was quite insignificant. The more significant
variations occurred across different branches of the indus-
tries. Material reprocessor had many more permanent
employees (these were usually small "cottage" industries
with the whole family participating). Temporary employees
formed the largest bulk.in all other industries.
43. Fluctuation of piece-wage was more significant during good
times than during bad ones. Entrepreneurs would raise wage
level during boom seasons to attract workers. But such
raise would very quickly be matched by other entrepreneurs.
44. These industrial branches were selected because together thy
employed sbout 80% of the total work force of the industries.
(the figures were confirmed by over 80% of the entrepreneurs
interviewed) The composition of worker types and skill mix
was obtained from entrepreneurs of small and medium factories.
-196-
The composition and mix could be different in larger fac-
tories. There would be a higher proportion of medium-skill
temporary employees. The basic core of skilled permanent
personnel would not increased very much proportionally.
But put-out work for piece-wage workers would be reduced,
especially for the shirt industry.
45. These industries might not have entirely similar labor
requirements. For example, the rattan industry would not
permit production outside the factory by individuals because
of the bulk of the raw material and the finished product.
However the types of wage relationship and skill would be
similar.
46. Energy as an input factor is not considered because
a. energy for all industries was the same --- electricity
from imported oil supplied by quasi-public power companies
at eaual rates, and
b. consumption of energy by the industries was not large
compared with the grand total consumption.
Locational variation in the availability of electricity is
discussed under the heading of land consideration (as part
of the infrastructure and amenity consideration).
47. For the shirt industry 95% of the products from large factories,
60%-70% from medium factories and 10%-20% from small factories
were for export. This puts 80% of the total output for
export. Similar situation occurred in the plastic industry.
(Wah Kiu Yat Po: Hong Kong Year Book, Hong Kong, Wah Kiu
Yat Po, 1956, p.A-70.)
48. The chief raw material for the shirt industry was cotton
cloths. Cotton bales came from the U.S. to spinning and
weaving mills in Hong Kong to be turned into cloths. Cloths
were also imported from Southeast Asia, East and West Africa,
Japan and Italy. Artifical fibre such as polyester and
Decron came later.
The chief raw material for the plastic industry were celluoid,
cellulose acetate, polystyrene, phenol formaldehyde, urea
formaldehyde, polyethene, nylon and polyvinylchloride. They
came initally from England (ICI) and the U.S.(Dow). Later
raw materials came also from Italy, West Germany and Japan.
Plastic waste came mainly from England and West Germany.
49. Any consideration of transportation between the warehouse
and the factory would be the same as that between point of
production and point of shipment in the case of export market
consideration.
50. It might also be true that small factories located near
retailers to take advantage of convenient purchase of small
quantities of materials.
51. for renting factory space, meeting payroll, maintenance
and operating costs and transport costs (raw materials
usually on credit)
52. Most money lenders were not institutionalized. Their money
lending activity was side-line business. They usually
lent money'only to those whom they knew or to those referred
to by people they knew. As a result ethnicity played a
very important part.
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53. Some sauatter areas had been surveyed by the government and
addresses were given. But many squatter areas, especially
new ones, had no addresses designations. There were also
new additions to existing souatters making the situation
even more confusing.
54. Most squatters had no motor roads, no electricity and water
supply and no centralized sewage disposal.
55. The loans were usually of small amount. The interest rates
were usually 1.5 to 3 times the bank lending rates.
56. Ethnicity also played an important part here. See footnote
24, Chapter 3.
57. Although the factory space to volume of output ratio was
smaller for larger factories when only shop floor space
was considered. But if all space requirements were taken
into consideration (administration, storage etc.) the
smaller factories seemed to be using less space for the
same volume of output. This might probably due to the
use of space-saving technology, multiple use of space, and
high tolerance of overcrowdedness.
58. There were some government control over the industrial use
of residential buildings, especially by the Fire Department
and the Urban Services Department (Sanitation). But
codes were obsolete and were not strictly and uniformly
enforced.
59. Along the edges of souatter areas, which abutted existing
urban areas, electricity and water supply could be obtained,
legally or illegally, more easily by branching from existing
facilities and amenities in the urban areas. Distance to
motor roads was also reduced.
60. Residential building plans were governed by building codes
which were interpreted by developers to obtain the maximum
permitted building volume. As a result building shapes
and volumes were similar for most buildings in urban areas.
61. The average density for low and medium income areas was
about 500 persons per acre. But in the more crowded
areas such as Shum Shui Po in Kowloon and the Western Dis-
trict in Hong Kong the density could exceed 1000 persons
per acre.
62. There was no severe legal problem to factory location in
residential areas. Significant difficulty was encountered
in getting large emough space (a whole floor) in the older
areas for efficient factory operation because of the pattern
of multiple sub-tenancy (sub-letting).
63. Infrastructures in the older areas were not designed to
anticipate the massive immigration and the industrial
take-off. They were built before the 2nd World War. The
worst problems occurred in sewage disposal. But problems
of traffic congestion was soon to dominate.
64. The magnitude of rent differential between the upper floors
and the ground floors in the same urban area was 1.5 to 2.
65. For rent consideration no distinction is made between the
different floom occupied by the factories in the same location.
The general rent level of either the upper or the ground
floors will be taken, depending on the prevalence of use of
those floors in a location.
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66. Rent accounted for some 5% to 20% of the total production
cost. Since it was a fixed cost the higher the production
level and lower the proportion of rent in the total pro-
duction cost.
67. Rents for the low to middle income residential areas ranged
from $0.20 to $0.30 per sq.ft. per month (i.e. $120 to
$180 a month for a flat of 600 sq.ft.). Rents for the
higher income areas were normally above $0.50 per sq.ft.
per month, and the area per floor was usually larger (above
1,000 sq.ft.).
68. New high income areas were also along the urban fringe.
On Hong Kong island these were located at the mid-level of
Victoria Peak above the lower income areas along the harbor
front and in the Happy Valley area. In Kowloon the new
high income areas were developed in Kowloon Tong.
See map on p.85.
69. In the early to mid 50's the cost of construction and the
cost of land for a multi-story residential building (say
6 stories) were roughly the same in the low to middle income
areas.
Land on Hong Kong island was leased for a much longer perio d
(75 - 999 years) because the island was ceded to the British.
Land in the New Kowloon area where most the newer develop-
ment took place was lease for a much shorter period because
the territory was leased from China with the expiration
date set for 1998. This difference was vital to land cost
But in the early to mid 50's economic growth was just begin-
ning, social demandd for land was only marginally effective
and the expiration date was still far away. As a result
the cost of land did not vary drastically to reflect this
different land lease terms.
70. 'Companies charged according to time-rent of truck. If
delivery could be done in one morning (9 a.m.- 1 p.m.) or
one afternoon (2 p.m.-6 p.m.) one shift would be charged.
Seldom more than I shift was needed, unless there was
unexpected delay at transfer points.
71. The weight and buld that could be carried by such modes of
transportation were quite small.
72. For comparison of public transportation services between
the early to mid 50's and the late 60's see footnote 41,
.Chapter 4.
73. Bus and tram fares in urban areas were $0.10 to $0.20 for
.one trip (adult fare) depending on the distance travelled.
Each route was charged separately. The minimum transport
cost ranged from $0.20 to $0.40. But the daily wage for
some low-skill wrokers would be as low as $1.50 (see footnote
39). Transport cost would be as high as 25% of income.
74. see footnote 5.
75. This distinction between the refugees and the local population
was a temporary phenomenon. By 1954 the proportion of
children attending school for the refugee group was similar
to that of the local population group. But the absolute
number of children not attending school was still great.
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It was estimated that there were 175,000 children between
the age of 5 to 14, who were not attending school, with the
majority being girls. (E. Hambro: The Problems of Chinese
Refugees in Hong Kong, Holland, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1955,
p. 55)
76. The average spatial standard in squatter areas was about
28 so.f t. per person as opposed to the less than 25 sq.ft
per person in the urban built-up areas. (0.J. Golgar: An
Environmental Study of Squatter and Resettlement Housing
in Hong Kong, Thesis (PhD), University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong, 1968, p.348.) However the survey sample was a very
limited one and should be treated with caution.
77. Higher spatial standards in private residential buildings
could not be effectively enforced during times of severe
housing shortage. In some newer urban areas overcrowdedness
was as high as, if not higher than, that in the older urban
areas.
78. see footnote 72.
79. This was usually combined with the shopping trip. The
shopping itself was time consuming. The market place was
extremely crowded and dirty. This made the carrying of
bulky and heavy loads to and from the factory unwelcome.
80. see "land consideration" in the "logic of location", Chapter
3, p. 81-83.
81. Agglomeration effects were of course perceived by these first
entrepreneurs. The availability of-factory space for shirt
and plastic manufacture could very well be the result of
the supporting industries locating at these districts in the
first place. But the evolution of land-use was of no
significance to the small entrepreneurs in making location
decisions.
CHAPTER 4
1. Total area was 296 acres(84 acres industry, 78 acres housing,
84 acres roads and 50 acres commercial, government use and
open space). The total population estimated in 1970 was
380,000.
2. see charts.
(Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department:
Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Govern-
ment Printer, 1969)
3. year student pooulation total population
1956 262,000 2,857,000
1969 1,130,000 4,039,700
4. By 1969 there were 23 housing sites with 1.1 million popu-
lation as opposed to 133,000 by 1955.
5. Private residential flats grew at the average rate 10,000
flats a year between 1958 and 1968.
(Wah Kiu Yat Po, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Year Book 1970, Hong
Kong, Wah Kiu Yat Po, p.53-54.)
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6. Total export increased steadily and phenomenally over the
past ten years.
year total export
19g0 HK$2,867 mu.
19§2 3317
1964 42
1.966 5,730
1968 8428 (clothing was 36% of the total)
The total number of factories increased 12 times over the
past 20 years (1,266 in 1949 to 14,4407 in-1969).
7. Unemployment was practically non-existent. There was a
severe shortage of industrial medium skilled workers. In
1968 the shortage for workers was 8,335 and in 1969 it jumped
to 16,953 (a 50% increase).
(Wah Kiu Yat Po, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Year Book 1970, Hong
Kong, Wah Kiu Yat Po, p.77)
8. see footnote 7, Chapter 3.
But it is likely that underestimation of the labor force
was not as much in the later periods with improved government
recording methods and increased factory sizes and more
s-ophisticated factory management.
9. Shirt export was about 15% of total clothing export in 1969.
HK$463 million in a total of HK$3,828 million.
10. Export total in 1959 was HK$2,282 million.
11. Export total in 1969 was HK$10,518 million ($5,027 in 1965).
12. For examplein 1959 restriction of export on textile to
Britain was extended to include garments. In the same year
there was agreement with the United States for a waiver for
the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, which included the following.
a. The exporting country enjoyed a right to administer its
restraints within any ceiling agreed with the importing
country.
b. Right to increase annual export by not less than 5%.
c. Right in some degree of latitude in -exchanging one item
of cotton goods for another.
13. Commissions were sent to promote products and to negotiate
favorable trade terms. Liason and information offices
were set up in foreign countries.
14. Cotton had been replaced by polyester and Decron etc. Much
of the cloth processing was done in Hong Kong instead of
elsewhere (dyeing, shrinking, printing, "sanforization" etc.).
15. size of factory moulding operators trimmers maintenance
(3 shifts) (u shift)
large 150 per shift 300-500 15
medium 60-70 100-150 10
small 15-20 20-30 5
16.
Many worked more than I shift (iJ shifts).
year shirt export plastic export
1968 HK$389 mil. HK$974 mil.
1969 463 1,077
Shirt export included unknitted shirts only.
Plastic export included toys, dolls and flowers.
total export
HK$7,460 mil.
9,421
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17. see footnote 7, Chapter 4.
18. Foreign capital came in large volumes because of
a. tnstable political conditions in Southeast Asia (esp.
Vietnamn) in general,
b. unfavorable political conditions for overseas Chinese
in Southeast Asia (esp. Indonesia, the Philippines,
Thailand and Burma), and
c. international monetary situation making investment in
Hong Kong attractive (stable economy). .
19. This included technological advances in production methods
as well as in transportation and management.
20. see footnote 8 and 10, Chapter 3.
21. This was a universal problem cited by entrepreneurs of all
different types and sizes of factories. For the larger
factories where a larger proportion of younger labor was
employed the problem was labor turnover. For the smaller
factories where there was still a high proportion of older
workers (male and female) the difficulty was finding re-
placement when these workers withdres from the labor market.
22. Unemployment was reduced to 1.2% by the mid 60's. The
civil unrest in 1967-1968 had closed many factories and
driven away investments. But by late 1969 the situation
had revived.
23. In the early 50's employers would not offer permanent
employment even when such was demanded by employees. By
the late 60's employers were still reluctant to offer
permanent employment but the attractiveness of permanent
employment to the workers had also decreased because of low
unemployment. Especially after the civil unrest of 1967-68
pwople considered the economic booms of the late 60's a
transient phenomenon and the commitments of permanent
employment "meaningless". Instead workers demanded the
immediate gains of better working conditions ad higher
fringe benefits.
24. see "labor consideration" in the "logic of location", Chapter
4, p.152.
25. The high turnover rate was due to the high mobility of the
labor force in general as well as the gradual withdrawal of
the older and more ".dependable" labor force from the market.
26. see "devision of labor", "standardization" and "internal
process coordination" in "the industries", Chapter 4, p. 124-
126.
27. see "land consideration" in the"logic of location", Chap-
ter 4, p. 143-145.
28. see footnote 40, Chapter 3.
29. see footnote 44, Chapter 3.
The difference in skill mix and employment pattern'between
large and mall factories were not as significant here as
in the early 50's. However distinctions seemed to occur
among the different branches of diversification in market
orientation and production methods within the same industry.
Those with more stable external markets and more systemized
production methods seemed to have more high skill personnel
and less piece-work workers.
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30. 75% of the shirt production and 80% of the plastic production
was for export.
31. This was the distance between Tsuen Wan, the industrial
town in the New Territories, and the port facilities in
Tsim Sha Tsui.
32. Plastic raw materials had dropped from HK$6-7 a pound to
HK$0.6-0.7 a pound.
33. It was estimated that during the high seasons about 30%
of the work in the shirt industry was contracted out to
sub-manufacturers.
34. Internal markets for shirts were booming in the late 60's.
It was estimated that about 15% of the large factories
and about 50% of the smaller factories were catering for
internal markets of various kinds.
35. see footnote 47, Chapter 3.
36. The New Territories are not considered inspite of the new
industrial towns of Tsuen Wan (largely completed), Castle
Peak and Shatin (planned). The development in Aberdeen on
the south side of Hong Kong island is also omitted. These
new urban areas are very important in the consideration of
urbanization and industrialization but their omission will
not weaken the logic of lpnd consideration in the location
of factories in the late 60's because
a. the trade-offs between the cost of factory space and
the availability of-appropriate space and infrastructure
were equally clear within the metropolitan area, without
having to consider the New Territories and Aberdeen, and
b.. their omission allows a clearer comparison of the logic
of location between the two periods discussed in this
research because the same metropolitan area was involved.
It will help to consider the New Territories and Aberdeen
as another metropolitan area.
37. These were new towns in the New Territories. They will
not be included in this discussion for reasons.stated in
footnote 36.
38.
39. The cost of factory space ranged between HK$1.00-$1.20 per
sq.ft. per month as compared with that between $0.20-$0.30
in the early to mid 50's.
40. This was primarily due to the differential cost in land.
Price of land for comparable multi-story flatted factories
was as follows.
Cheung Sha Wan HK$70 per sq.ft.
San Po Kong 60
Kwun Tong 50
Chai Wan (Hong Kong) 40-45
(Wah Kiu Yat Po, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Year Book 1970, Hong
Kong, Wah Kiu Yat Po, 1971)
41. The public transport route network in 1947 had a total
mileage of 215 of which only 60 miles were in urban Hong Kong.
This total had been more than doubled by 1956 and trebbed
by 1966. The share of the urban mileage in 1966 represented
more than a third of the total, as compared with only slightly
more than a quarter in 1947.
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1956 1970
Hong Kong
bus
passenger-trips 53 mil. 211 mil,
total mileage 7.4nil. 19.8mil.
# of bus in service 183 481
tram
passenger-trips 141 mil. 154 mil.
total mileage 6 mil.
# of trams 120 178
Kowloon
bus
passenger-trips 100 mil. 618 mil.
total mileage . 10 mil. 49.1mil.
# of bus in serv., 365 650
See also maps of network and public transportation service
comparison. Map 1 and 2.
(Dwyer, D.J.: Asian Urbanization, A Hong Kong Casebook
( An article by C.K. Leung: The Growth of Internal Public
Transportation, p.147 )) Hong Kong, Hong Kong University
Press, 1.971.)
42. Fares in the late 60's were HK$0.20 a trip within the metro-
politan area (the same as in the early to mid 50's). But
daily wages had increased many-fold --- HK$14.8 for the
g arment (shirt) industry and $13.2 for the plastic industry.
Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Deportment:
Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Feb., 1974, Hong
Kong Government Printer, Hong Kong.)
43. see "labor requirement" in "the industries", Chapter 4,
p. 135, and also footnote 23, Chapter 4.
44. see "transportation consideration" in "the logic of location",
Chapter 4, p. 147-1.49.
45. see "the people" in "background", Chapter 4, p. 117.
46.-see footnote 7, Chapter 4.
47. see "industrial development" in "background", Chapter 4,
p.118-119.
48. see "land consideration" in the "logic of location", Chapter
4, p. 143-145.
49. This was a necessary price for survival even when transpor-
tation network and labor mobility had reduced the signifi-
cance of urban centre locations.
50. It was estimated that about 1/3 of the factories were small
i.e. having no more than 50 sewing machines or 20 plastic
moulding machines.
51. For example, some small factories produced very low price
shirts for low-income local consumers, some plastic manu-
facturere produced crude by heavy and durable plastic
utensils for restaurant use or for people to bring to their
relatives in China.
52. For example, plastic components were needed for other metal
industries (e.g. flash light parts) and electronic industries
(e.g. casings).
53. Residential use usually tended to bid up the price of land
and industrial use of residential area usually tended to
pull down the price of the area as a whole.
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54. Cheung Sha Wan was primarily a residential-industrial area
in the early to mid 50's. But when retails moved in
after the area became densely residential the rent level
moved up much faster (for all industrial, residential and
commercial users) than other areas which had always been
industrial only (e.g. San Po Kong).
55. Shum Shui Po had a higher rent level than many other areas
with comparable land conditions. But since it was one of
the earliest areas with industrial use many earlier factories
would not move out, when they expanded, thus -accentuating
the scarcity of factory space in the area and raising the
general rent level.
56. There were old pre-2nd World War buildings in the older urban
areas, which had been used by industries. But new factories
would not be permitted to start operation in those buildings.
Thus the existing rent level in those areas would either
understate or overstate the demand for such areas.
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TAI1.E 1
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO PRESENT OCCUPATION IN
HONG KONG
Percentages, June 1954 a
Pre- Post-war immigrants
Occupation Hong war
in Hong Kong Kong- immi- Politico- Econo- Unspe-bo grants Political econo- mic cified Total
mic
1. Farmers . . . . . . ... 1.1 2.1 1.2 1.3 - 1.6
2. Fishermen . . . . . ... 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 - 0.2
Total, I and 2 ..... 20.0 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.8
3. Coolics and amahs.. 5.0 11.4 9.9 10.6 12.7 5.9 11.0
4. Cottage craftsmen . 3.2 6.8 11.2 12.8 6.5 2.0 9.5
5. Industrial labourerse 7.8 8.6 13.7 12.6 11.4 19.6 12.6
6. Independent craftsmen 3.3 4.5 2.0 2.0 3.8 3.9 2.7
7. Hawkers .. . . . . . 6.1 8.5 7.9 6.1 7.4 2.0 7.4
Total, 3-7 . . . . . . . .25.4 39.8 44.7 44.1 41.8 33.4 43.2
8. Clerks and shop
assistantts c . . . . . . . 6.6 6.5 4.7 6.1 6.0 3.9 5.3
9. Business menc. . . . . 2.1 2.2 1.2 2.0 2.0 3.9 1.6
10. Professionals and
intellectuals . . . . . . 1.7 1.9 4.7 5.3 1.7 5.9 3.5
11. Army and police . . . 1.2 2.1 0.2 - 0.2 0.2
Total, 8-11 . . . . . . 11.6 12.7 10.8 13.4 9.9 13.7 10.6
12. Others e . . . . . . . . 6.5 4.6 4.4 6.5 4.7 5.9 4.8
13. Unemployed 8.0 11.5 16.6 12.0 13.4 17.6 15.1
14. Housewives . . . . . . 28.5 29.6 21.3 22.4 28.8 29.4 24.5
TOTAL . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1o0.0
a Source: Sample Survey of Hong Kong's Population carried out by the Mission. The figures relate to both
sexes, excluding children and students.
b Re-estimated distribution.
C See notes under Table XXIX.
UAMBRO, . fV6 VfoBt(M oF Of [EIti f *uef I MORite 900t4
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TASLE 2
OCCUPATIONAL DOWN-GRADING OF CHINESE POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS IN HONG KONG
Percentages, June 1954 a
Farmers .............
Fishermen ............
Coolies and amahs b
Cottage craftsmen ........
Industrial labourers b.
Independent craftsmen . . .
Hawkersb . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clerks and shop assistantsb
Business menb..........
Professionals and intellectuals
Army Other ranks . . . .
and - N.C.O.s . . . . . .
Police b Officers . . . . ..
Others b . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . .
44.51
20.0
47.2
66.6
44.8
9.2
4.9
23.3
0.5
1.2
0.2
(51.15
(59.5)j
40.0
13.9
C.7
3.4
24.7
10.8
6.6
35.3
29.6
6.3
22.2
19.4
6.7
6.9
9.9
2.9
21.1
4.9
5.1
3.7
40.5
60.0!
80.5
80.0
55.1
43.8
18.6'
29.9
56.9
35.7
11.6
37.0
100.0,
30.0
11.1
6.7
17.3
31.5
47.1
46.7
19.7
44.5
61.7
23.2
I 10.0
8,4
133 
27.6
24.7
34.3
23.4
23.4
19.8
26.7
39.8
(59.5)
100,
100'
1o
100
100:
100
100
100,
100
100
100
100
100
100
48.4
50.0
46.2
64.9
32.1
27.1
14.5
25.8
21.9
(51.7)!
20.4
12.5
8.1
9.5
16.8
16.9
23.6
29.6
10.0
9.1
19.8
11.1
10.0
2.7
4.8
6.4
1.6
25.9
10.0
9.1
2.1
48.3
111.5
68.7
75.7t
46.4
50.3
33.0'
49.4
55.5
20.0
18.21
43.811
100.0|
3.7
10.0
14.9
36.9
21.3
45.2
28.1
11.1
50.0
72.7
30.2
16.1
14.8
21.3
9.4
16.7
28.4
21.8
33.4
30.0
9.1
26.0
(51.7)
1u 46.4
100 46.4
100, 46.4
100 44.3
100. 60.4
100 33.0
100 16.3
100 11.3
100 24.9
100 04'
100; 1.0
100. 0.2
100 18.7
i (53.4);
10.0
26.8
24.6
12.8
8.3
7.5
22.4
12.8
10.3
35.1
27.8
6.6
20.0
10.0
7.3
8.7
14.3
3.1
5.0
8.3
2.3
21.3
5.2
5.1
3.0
46.6
60.0,
80.5
79.7
71.4!
71.8
47.5
47.0
26.4
35.2
56.8
34.0,
11.9:
41.7
100.0
46.1
30.0
7.2
12.8
18.8
32.5
28.1
44.7
42.5
18.6
45.4
63.0
26.4
11.8
10.0
19.5
13.1
15.8
9.4
20.0
24.9
28.9
22.3
24.6
20.6
25.1
31.9
(53.4),
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
TorAL. I. .. ........... 11.8 15.8 8.1 35.7 39.6 24.7 100 24.1 16.9 11.6 52.6 30.2 1 17.2 100, 17.1 16.2 9.3 42.6 36.1 21.3 100
ToA.. 2d -.......... 10.5 15.8 8.1 34.4 39.6 26.0 100' 21.6 16.9 11.6 50.1 30.2 19.7 100 15.5 16.2 9.3 41.0 36.1 22.9 00
&urce: Sample Sumvy of fHung Kong's Pop-datioa carriel out by the Mission. The figures relate to both sexes, excluding housewives. students and children.
See notes under Table XXIX.
Unemployed on the mainland in column "Simsilar occupation".
Unemployed on the mainland in column "Unemployed".
The totals include politico-economic inunigrants an I immigrants for umnpecified reason; the percentages for those groups have not been computed separately on account
of the sample values being too small.
WXgAtf 60 FROM 1AMt X01l
4fA4140 . .: 1'se ?uce9LM of OfMstg, reduf$ tU 14e4. IcIIs
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